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"Ordinary mortals know what’s happening now,
The gods know what the future holds
Because they alone are totally enlightened.
Wise men are aware of future things
Just about to happen."




A gradual move in the electric power industry towards Smart Grids brings new
challenges to the system’s efficiency and dependability. With a growing com-
plexity and massive introduction of renewable generation, particularly at the
distribution level, the number of faults and, consequently, disturbances (errors
and failures) is expected to increase significantly. This threatens to compromise
grid’s availability as traditional, reactive management approaches may soon be-
come insufficient. On the other hand, with grids’ digitalization, real-time sta-
tus data are becoming available. These data may be used to develop advanced
management and control methods for a sustainable, more efficient and more de-
pendable grid. A proactive management approach, based on the use of real-time
data for predicting near-future disturbances and acting in their anticipation, has
already been identified by the Smart Grid community as one of the main pillars
of dependability of the future grid.
The work presented in this dissertation focuses on predicting disturbances
in Active Distributions Networks (ADNs) that are a part of the Smart Grid that
evolves the most. These are distribution networks with high share of (renew-
able) distributed generation and with systems in place for real-time monitoring
and control. Our main goal is to develop a methodology for proactive network
management, in a sense of proactive mitigation of disturbances, and to design
and implement a method for their prediction. We focus on predicting voltage
sags as they are identified as one of the most frequent and severe disturbances
in distribution networks.
We address Smart Grid dependability in a holistic manner by considering
its cyber and physical aspects. As a result, we identify Smart Grid dependabil-
ity properties and develop a taxonomy of faults that contribute to better under-
standing of the overall dependability of the future grid. As the process of grid’s
digitization is still ongoing there is a general problem of a lack of data on the
grid’s status and especially disturbance-related data. These data are necessary
to design an accurate disturbance predictor. To overcome this obstacle we in-
troduce a concept of fault injection to simulation of power systems. We develop
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a framework to simulate a behavior of distribution networks in the presence of
faults, and fluctuating generation and load that, alone or combined, may cause
disturbances. With the framework we generate a large set of data that we use
to develop and evaluate a voltage-sag disturbance predictor. To quantify how
prediction and proactive mitigation of disturbances enhance availability we cre-
ate an availability model of a proactive management. The model is generic and
may be applied to evaluate the effect of proactive management on availability in
other types of systems, and adapted for quantifying other types of properties as
well. Also, we design a metric and a method for optimizing failure prediction to
maximize availability with proactive approach.
In our conclusion, the level of availability improvement with proactive ap-
proach is comparable to the one when using high-reliability and costly compo-
nents. Following the results of the case study conducted for a 14-bus ADN, grid’s
availability may be improved by up to an order of magnitude if disturbances are
managed proactively instead of reactively.
The main results and contributions may be summarized as follows: (i) Taxon-
omy of faults in Smart Grid has been developed; (ii) Methodology and methods
for proactive management of disturbances have been proposed; (iii) Model to
quantify availability with proactive management has been developed; (iv) Sim-
ulation and fault-injection framework has been designed and implemented to
generate disturbance-related data; (v) In the scope of a case study, a voltage-
sag predictor, based on machine-learning classification algorithms, has been de-
signed and the effect of proactive disturbance management on downtime and
availability has been quantified.
Keywords: Active Distribution Networks, Availability, Data analytics, De-
pendability, Disturbances, Fault injection, Machine learning, Prediction, Proac-
tive management, Simulation, Smart Grid, Voltage sags
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
A concept of Smart Grid is first introduced and frequently used Smart Grid defi-
nitions are reviewed. The main needs for modernization of electric power grids,
trends and enabling technologies are then explained in more detail. Following
this, rising Smart Grid dependability concerns are identified, giving a broader
motivation for the work presented in the manuscript. A proactive management
paradigm, as one of the ways to address these concerns, is then described. Next,
the addressed problem and the problem area are specified followed by a list of
major contributions.
1.1 Smart Grids - A Brief Overview
Essentially, Smart Grid may be described as an electric power system that, in the
light of growing demand and efforts to reduce the use of fossil fuels, relies on
renewable generation as well as on enhanced control that is based on a wider
adoption of ICT elements and data analytics in order to ensure sustainable elec-
tric power delivery, to keep the system reliable, to make it more efficient and cost
effective, as well as to provide new customer services. The Smart Grid concept
is still under development and thus it lacks a formal, comprehensive and widely-
accepted definition. Instead, a few definitions are used in the community, each
emphasizing different aspects of Smart Grids.
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) uses the term
"Smart Grid" to refer to "a modernization of the electricity delivery system so that
it monitors, protects and automatically optimizes the operation of its intercon-
nected elements - from the central and distributed generator through the high-
voltage transmission network and the distribution system, to industrial users and
building automation systems, to energy storage installations and to end-use con-
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sumers and their thermostats, electric vehicles, appliances and other household
devices [1]." European Technology Platform’s Smart Grid definition is more con-
cise describing it as "an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the
actions of all users connected to it - generators, consumers and those that do
both - in order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic and secure electric-
ity supplies [2]." Major industry players such as ABB, General Electric, IBM, and
Siemens as well as professional associations including CIGRE and IEEE also have
their own definitions. A comprehensive overview of them and other ones may
be found in [3].
Considering these and other definitions including those given in [4, 5, 6, 7, 8],
in a very broad sense, Smart Grid may be described as an evolved electric power
system that supports integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), Re-
newable Energy Sources (RES’es), Energy Storages (ES’es), and Electric Vehicles
(EVs). It relies on massive adaptation of ICT components such as meters and
sensors for better grid visibility at all levels, reliable and cyber-secure two-way
communication, and the use of online information for provision of new services
to both system operators and customers as well as methods for optimizing man-
agement to meet efficiency, cost effectiveness, dependability, resilience and sus-
tainability requirements.
An overview of the main Smart Grid structural elements, with the focus on
the distribution network is presented in Figure 1.1. This is an extended version
of a figure that has been originally published in [9].
Figure 1.1. Overview of Smart Grid elements.
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1.1.1 Needs and Trends
The structure of today’s electric power system has not essentially changed since
the end of the 19th century. It is based on the generation-transmission-distribution-
consumption paradigm and on a unidirectional power flow [10]. With some aged
and, with respect to today’s requirements, outdated components, parts of the
power system are already operating at their full capacity [11] as the grid is ap-
proaching its operational limits [12]. On the other hand, despite more efficient
industrial processes, a demand for electricity is gradually increasing. According
to EUREL’s1 forecast from 2013 [13], annual electricity demand in Europe will
rise to approximately 4300 TWh by 2050. For the comparison, electricity con-
sumption in Europe in 2008 was 3043 TWh. This requires an increase in power
generation but also a grid modernization in a sense of structural changes and
new management strategies in order to support delivery of more power while
maintaining the system’s stability. Moreover, as the process of electrification in
developing countries is still ongoing, the grid is also gradually expanding.
Efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emission drive additional changes in
power systems. This includes an increase in use of electric power in industry
and transportation (e.g. electric vehicles) and decrease of share of fossil fuels in
electricity generation-mix by using more RES’es. EU is particularly interested in
wider adaptation of renewable generation as a part of decreasing its dependency
on fossil fuel import. Initiative of the EU commission is to increase the share of
generation from RES’es from today’s 25% to 40% until 2020. Also, the forecasts
are that renewable capacities production by 2050 will be between 50% and 80%
[13]. This causes a major paradigm shift from traditional, centralized, to dis-
tributed electric power generation as most of the renewable generation is based
on DERs. It particularly effects distribution part of the grid as it has to support a
bidirectional energy flow in order to accept a larger number of distributed gen-
erators. Management strategies and protection mechanisms will also have to be
adapted and improved to ensure system’s efficiency and stability especially con-
sidering volatile nature of renewable generation. In fact, when well controlled,
DERs may even provide an opportunity to enhance grid’s stability and depend-
ability [14, 15]. Higher adaptation of DERs is also in line with energy market
deregulation (liberalization) efforts that aim at increasing competition to moti-
vate better, more efficient and less expensive electric power system services. On
the other hand, this calls for more changes in the system management due to
decentralized decision making, interdependencies and a lack of fully centralized
1EUREL - The Convention of National Association of Electrical Engineers of Europe,
www.eurel.org/
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control over system components [16].
Massive adaptation of (plug-in hybrid) EVs is another opportunity to signifi-
cantly reduce green-house gas emission provided a high emission share of tran-
spiration in developed countries [17]. On the other hand, power demanding
EVs will add a significant load to the existing distribution system and, in some
cases may cause overloads as well as power quality degradations. Coordinated
charging of EVs may help in overcoming some of these problems [18].
Volatile nature of DERs, their low controllability and increasing number of
EVs, trigger another important change in the system operation approach from
traditional, consumption-driven generation to generation-driven consumption.
In fact, various Demand Side Management (DSM) strategies are already being
put in place to change power demand through dynamic pricing, greater customer
engagement and various other initiatives, in order to tailor consumption to the
current production and state of the grid and to maintain the power balance [19].
For example, with DSM a consumption at peak hours may be decreased so that
generation can meet the demand such that system’s stability is not jeopardized.
At the same time DSM aims at maximizing local consumption from DERs which
decreases transmission and distribution losses as well as avoiding investments in
long-distance transmission lines [12].
Better control and integration of DERs, may be realized through the concept
of Virtual Power Plan (VPP) [20, 21]. A VPP is a logical aggregation of DERs that,
considering their place in the grid and the current status information, manages
generation and presents the entire aggregation, to the rest of the system, as one,
virtual generator equivalent to a traditional centralized power plant. This way,
a VPP increases visibility of DERs and allows their integration into the grid. The
concept of VPPs has been further expanded to Virtual Power Systems (VPS’es)
that represent logical aggregations of DERs and controllable loads. That way,
energy balance is optimized within a VPS and, from the perspective of the rest
of the grid, the aggregation is considered as a "prosumer" that, depending on the
current power balance, may be seen as a load or as a generator [22]. A similar
approach is taken in Microgrids. These are distribution grids that may operate
interdependently but may still be connected to the central grid.
Higher adaptation of DERs and EVs also brings new opportunities for pro-
vision of ancillary services. These are additional services provided on top of
real power generation and distribution, including reactive power supply, voltage
and frequency control, operating reserves, energy balance, and network stabil-
ity [23]. For example, a vehicle-to-grid (V2G) concept proposes to use batteries
of stationary EVs to provide power to the grid in the case of unpredicted load
increase and insufficient generation [24].
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1.1.2 Enabling Technologies
The backbone to fulfilling the aforementioned needs and to realize described con-
cepts and trends is the ICT infrastructure that includes monitoring, data acquisi-
tion, and communication infrastructures as well as advanced data analytics and
simulation tools to improve grid status awareness and to provide a basis for post-
mortem analysis as well as for online detection and prediction of disturbances.
This information is then used for planning grid improvements and extensions
and for real-time control. In addition, for implementing real-time control, it is
necessary to deploy responsive actuators and control devices in order to be able
to quickly react on detected or predicted events.
1.1.2.1 Monitoring and Communication Infrastructure
Grid monitoring and data acquisition infrastructure, at power distribution level,
includes various meters, sensors as well as systems for data collection and ag-
gregation. Automatic Metering Infrastructure (AMI) which relies on smart me-
tering technologies allow not only to automatically collect consumption readings
and device status information but also, using two-way communication, to con-
trol these devices remotely [4]. In most of today’s implementations the control
through meters, is limited to switching the power in an entire household whereas
switchers and actuators may be used to control individual devices.
Various types of sensor networks, for example, the one proposed in [25], may
be installed to observe the grid health-status at distribution level. In that sense,
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are becoming increasingly important as they
provide UTC time-tagged and synchronized estimations of electricity waveforms
(frequency, rate-of-change-of-frequency, and voltage/current phasors) [26] in
resolution much higher than the traditional Supervisory Control And Data Acqui-
sition (SCADA) systems may provide [8]. Typical sampling period of a SCADA
system is between 2 s and 4 s [8], whereas modern PMUs provide measurements
at every 20 ms [27]. The principle of PMU operation is based on sampling wave-
forms and synchronizing them using an accurate time reference. A synchronpha-
sor estimator then extracts the base tone from the sampled (raw) data collected
over the PMU sampling period (observe that sampling of raw data occurs with
much shorter period) and provides an estimated waveform as an output. Ob-
viously, the process introduces uncertainty and the accuracy of the estimated
waveforms depends on the accuracy of the time source, sampling and condition-
ing unit and the synchronphasor. Details on PMU operation may be found in [26]
and [28].
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Having high sampling rate and being more accurate than the other mon-
itoring devices, PMUs are the central part of Wide-Area Monitoring Systems
(WAMS’es) and are the basis for accurate state estimation and real-time visibility
of the grid and its parts [29]. Moreover, PMU data may be used for monitoring
instabilities, and detecting and locating disturbances [4]. As relatively expensive
devices there are mostly used at transmission level but their adoption is expected
to take part also at distribution level in particular in ADNs. For example, [30]
proposes a solution for integrating PMUs into monitoring system of distribution
networks that have high share of renewable generation.
Smart Grids fully rely on a secure and reliable two-way communication in-
frastructure for the delivery of real-time information to processing centers and
for sending the control signals back to actuating devices. Smart Grid commu-
nication infrastructure itself is a highly complex system that allows communica-
tion between all system elements while incorporating business and home area
networks to connect to office and household appliances [31]. In order to fulfill
these requirements, different communication technologies have to be combined
including power-line communication (PLC), fiber optics and numerous wireless
solutions from Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), GSM, GPRS to satellite com-
munication [4]. Standardization and interoperability of existing technologies
represent one of the most challenging tasks when it comes to implementation of
this aspect of Smart Grid concept. In that respect, remarkable efforts have been
invested and considerable progress has been made with wider implementation
of substations automation as well as communication standard synchronization
through a number of widely promoted and accepted standards and protocols
such as CIM and IEC61850 [3].
1.1.2.2 Data Analytics
The process of power grid digitalization is still ongoing but, according to [32],
the data volume in Smart Grids will be still greater by multiple orders of mag-
nitude than in traditional grids. This includes operational data (e.g. voltage,
phase, and active and reactive power measurements), non-operational data (e.g.
power quality and reliability data), meter usage data (e.g. statistics on average
and peak consumption), event message data (e.g. fault detection messages),
and metadata (e.g. grid topology). In fact, a vast amount of data is already
being collected from various devices in different formats and their unification
is necessary in order to process such a data volume. This is the main motiva-
tion for the development of a standard data exchange framework known as the
Common Information Model (CIM) [33]. CIM defines interoperability seman-
7 1.1 Smart Grids - A Brief Overview
tics, syntax for data exchange and proposes implementation technologies. This
data may be further analyzed in a centralized or distributed fashion as a part
of the existing SCADA, Energy Management Systems (EMS’es) and Distribution
Management Systems (DMS’es). Enablers for the data analysis are high perfor-
mance and cloud computing systems [8] and the main goal is to provide more
accurate and optimal grid management through better understanding of the grid
state and the prediction of future state.
The current trend is mainly in statistical analysis and postmortem analysis but
also in real-time state estimation [29], grid status visualization [34], and demand
forecast. Future applications may include also prediction of grid disturbances
(as, for example, planned in the scope of the GridEye/FNET project [34]) [8].
Also, IBM’s vision on big data in Smart Grids [35] is to use predictive analytics not
only for a wide range of predictions including demand and generation forecasts
and anticipation of customers’ behavior but also for the prediction of equipment
downtime and grid failures.
1.1.2.3 Simulation Tools
Considering safety-critical aspects of the grid, simulation provides an affordable
and safe alternative to analyze and to validate new control strategies before their
deployment. A challenge for Smart Grid simulation tools is that, besides simulat-
ing state of the electric infrastructure with high sampling rate and incorporating
advanced components such as PMUs [36], they must also consider ICT infras-
tructure as well as their interdependency. We give a brief overview of only a few
commonly used commercial and academic tools whereas a more comprehensive
and an up-to-date list may be found at OpenElectrical’s page2.
• Power System Planning and Data Management (PSS)3 is a set of tools pro-
vided by Siemens for system planning and operation with accurate and effi-
cient system analyses. This includes tools for contingency and fault analysis
as well as modeling of corrective actions, analysis during changing network
conditions, simulation of distributed generation, dynamic simulations in
time and frequency domains and CIM-compliant data representation. It is
also important to point out that PSS is frequently used as a benchmark for
validation of open-source tools.
2OpenElectrical’s list of power systems analysis software,
http://www.openelectrical.org/wiki/index.php?title=Power_Systems_Analysis_Software
3Siemens Power System Planning and Data Management suite,
http://w3.siemens.com/smartgrid/global/en/products-systems-solutions/software-
solutions/planning-data-management-software/Pages/overview.aspx
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• Neplan4 is Swiss-based company modular software based on MATLAB and
C/C++ that provides a number of features ranging from load flow, dy-
namic simulation, and optimal power flow to reliability analysis and load
forecasting.
• DIgSILENT PowerFactory5, is a Windows-based integrated power systems
modeling and analysis package that, besides standard power system analy-
sis, includes high-end applications in new technologies such as wind power
and distributed generation as well as algorithms for handling very large
power systems.
• OPAL-RT HYPERSIM6 is a real-time simulation platform that supports in-
tegration of DERs and incorporates real-time monitoring, control and pro-
tection features. It also supports hardware-in-the-loop testing.
• MatDyn7 [37] is an open-source software for dynamic analysis of power
systems developed as an extension of MATPOWER8 [38] simulation tool
for load flow and optimal power flow analysis.
• Power Systems Analysis Toolbox (PSAT)9 [39] is an open-source MATLAB-
based tool for analysis and design of small to medium size electric power
systems that supports power flow, continuation power flow, optimal power
flow, small-signal stability analysis, and time-domain simulation. It also
includes several static and dynamic models of distribution and transmission
grids.
1.1.2.4 Real-Time Actuators and Controllers
In order to be able to apply management strategies based on data analytics for
grid control and to quickly react to detected or anticipated problems, new types
of intelligent devices and actuators must be widely deployed. Among those that
are expected to significantly contribute to the system’s reliability are Intelligent
Embedded Devices (IEDs), Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS) and Solid-
State Transformers (SSTs). IEDs may be controlled not only remotely but also
provide the capability of local data processing and decision making. Different
types of IEDs may also be used to control household appliances. FACTS provide
control of AC transmission parameters. For example, they can alter power flow






9Power Systems Analysis Toolbox (PSAT), http://faraday1.ucd.ie/psat.html
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devices may help improving system’s reliability [40]. SSTs are lighter and more
efficient than traditional transformers. Moreover, they come with new functions
such as power flow control, voltage sag compensation, and fault current limita-
tion [41]. As such, they are also seen as an efficient way of coping with intermit-
tent nature of renewable energy generators.
1.1.3 Active Distribution Networks
A traditional distribution network is designed as a passive one with radial topol-
ogy and unidirectional power flow. It accepts bulk power from the transmission
grid and distributes it to customers [42]. Typically, it has a very limited monitor-
ing infrastructure as most of the power flow problems are resolved at planning
and design time [43, 44].
With exponential growth of distributed resources (DG) that include both
DERs and ES’es, distribution network is significantly changing and becoming an
active part of the power system. As defined by International Council on Large
Electric Systems (CIGRE)10 an Active Distribution Network (ADN) is a distribu-
tion network that has systems in place to control a combination of distributed
energy source (generators, loads and storage) [45].
With topology changes, bidirectional energy flow and intermittent resources,
more faults and disturbances may be expected at this level of the grid. This
includes greater voltage variations, power imbalance and supply quality decrease
in general [44]. Redundancy, as a way to ensuring network’s reliability may be
too expensive and also not sufficiently efficient solution from the perspective
of generated power exploitation. Therefore, novel control algorithms must be
developed and put in place. This includes methods for fast online state estimation
with PMUs [29, 46] as well as methods for DERs [47] and ES’es [48] integration
and control for voltage and frequency regulation.
1.2 Rising Smart Grid Dependability Concerns
Compromising power system’s dependability may cause a high financial loss or
may even have more severe consequences related to grid’s safety-critical aspects.
According to US Department of Energy report from 2009, an annual cost of power
outages and interruptions in US is at least 150 billion dollars [49]. The same
report reveals that grid’s availability in US equals to 0.9997 that corresponds
to more than 2.5 h of complete power interruption per year. Considering the
10International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE), http://www.cigre.org/
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challenges that were reviewed in the previous subsections, we may only expect
a decrease in availability if new approaches to maintain grid’s dependability are
not imposed.
1.2.1 Dependability Challenges
With (r)evolution of electric power systems and foreseen changes, the risk of
compromising its dependability is increasing. Here we identify, categorize and
describe the main Smart Grid dependability challenges:
• Complexity and interdependency With evolution towards Smart Grid,
complexity of the system is rapidly increasing, and ensuring its dependabil-
ity becomes more difficult, especially when taken into account that Smart
Grid closely combines electric power and ICT infrastructures. As such, it is
a good example of a system-of-systems whose operation and management
requires to combine knowledge and best practice from various domains.
Since a systematic approach to Smart Grid dependability does not exist
at this time, the danger is that dependability may be compromised due
to generally different approaches in the two communities (ICT and electric
power), including diverse terminology for dependability attributes and fre-
quently interchangeable use of terms [50], different understanding of ba-
sic concepts such as fault, error and failure, and different figures of merit
for the quantification of dependability attributes. Moreover, with growing
interdependency between ICT (cyber) and electric power (physical) infras-
tructures, components’ failures may propagate from one infrastructure to
another [51], causing errors and failures.
• Structural changes. Generation paradigm shift and bidirectional energy
flow significantly change grid’s structure, especially at the distribution level.
Protection systems are designed with unidirectional power flow in mind
[14] and they may fail to ensure reliability when the flow is bidirectional.
Moreover, due to deregulation and economic reasons, the system is be-
coming more congested, has fewer redundant components and frequently
operates at its full capacity.
• Increasing number of faults. Due to growing complexity, we may expect
an increase in the number of faults and also new types of power grid faults
in the near future [52]. Aging infrastructure and smaller energy margins
may also cause an increase in the number of faults. Finally, as the com-
plexity increases, more human faults may also be expected.
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• Uncertainties. With the market deregulation, the level of uncertainty in
power systems has increased significantly [53]. This includes uncertainty
on availability of generators, transmission and distribution lines, electricity
prices as well as uncertainty on load and (renewable) generation forecasts
that are frequently weakly correlated with real production and consump-
tion [5]. Volatile nature of RES’es particularly contributes to the uncer-
tainty of electric power generation. Moreover, with growing demand and
introduction of EVs as power-demanding loads, predicting customers be-
havior is ever-more important and, at the same time, more challenging.
• Cyber security. As the Smart Grid expands and incorporates more ICT el-
ements, from servers to embedded devices and even novel technologies as
Internet-of-Things (IoT), it opens a door to a plethora of attack opportuni-
ties that bring its security concerns to an extreme [54]. Practically, every
connected device (e.g. a smart meter or a household appliance) is a poten-
tial gateway for a cyber-attack [4]. Some of these attacks may also cause
malfunction of power equipment, disturbances and outages, thus reducing
power delivery service availability. In fact, a few recent outages are be-
lieved to have been caused by cyber-attacks (e.g. those reported in [55]).
All of this is threatening to increase the number and severity of disturbances,
including voltage and frequency deviations as well as brownouts (long-term volt-
age drops) and blackouts. For example, one such blackout occurred in Amster-
dam (that is considered to be an advanced-stage Smart City with a Smart Micro-
grid), in March 2015 affecting almost 3 million people [56]. In [57] we have
reviewed almost 40 recent events such as this one. Many of these events have
left tens and hundreds of millions of people without electricity for tens of hours.
This obviously demonstrates the need for new methods for grid management.
1.2.2 A Need for Revision of Power Grid Reliability Standards
Power grid reliability standards, that are still in use, have been defined in 1950s
and need to be fundamentally reviewed in the light of the grid evolution [15]. In
brief, these standards mainly require sufficient redundancy to ensure reliability
and do not consider Smart Grid solutions based on, for example, real-time moni-
toring and control and energy storage. As such they are not economically efficient
as the result is low utilization of assets and higher operational cost. Moreover,
the current standard is deterministic in the sense that the system is considered
as free of risks of disturbances as long as no operational limits are violated (e.g.
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all voltages and frequencies are in a defined range), and in an unacceptable level
of risk if operating limits are violated. A more realistic approach would be to es-
timate the risk of a disturbance at runtime considering current system state and
previously observed disturbances.
On the other hand, understanding dependability of Smart Grid and proposing
new standards is difficult as the concept is still under development and the grid
is evolving gradually. There is still not sufficient data to model and to evaluate
dependability and to design new methods for its enhancement. Even when dis-
turbance data is available, for example in industrial pilots, due to high sensitivity
and security concerns, such data is rarely, if at all, available for public use.
1.2.3 Dependability of Active Distribution Networks
As distribution grids are rapidly evolving towards Active Distribution Networks,
there is a concern that dependability of this part of the grid may also be affected
to a greater extent. In fact, Distribution System Operators (DSOs) are already
faced with disturbances such as voltage variations and congestions [44]. Over-
voltage is a common problem that occurs at a DER connection point and the
surrounding area. Reverse power flow may also occur due to a DER generation
that compromises dependability as protection schemes in a radial distribution
network that are designed with unidirectional flow in mind.
Voltage sags and swells are particularly dangerous as they may damage volt-
age sensitive equipment [58]. As defined by IEEE standard 1159 [59], a voltage
sag (dip) is a decrease in voltage root mean square (rms) value to between 0.1
and 0.9 from the nominal value for a duration of 0.5 cycle to 1 minute. Similarly,
a swell (surge) is an increase of rms to between 1.1 and 1.8 of the nominal value
for 0.5 cycle to 1 minute. Voltage problems in general are identified as the most
severe ones in distribution grids as frequency is regulated at higher levels. In
fact, voltage disturbances are also observed in some mid-size ADNs such as the
one in Rheinfelden, Switzerland and that has been analyzed in the scope of the
VEiN11 project.
A congestion is a type of power imbalance that occurs when a distributed gen-
erator pushes the system beyond its physical limits causing a power interruption.
An imbalance may also occur when local generation is not sufficient to meet the
demand. In principal, DERs may help ADN’s dependability if well controlled and
if sufficiently close to points of consumption. Unfortunately, this is not always
the case as DERs, in most cases, cannot be dispatched [44].
11VEiN: Verteilte Einspeisung in Niederspannungsnetze, http://www.vein-grid.ch
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There are several ways of coping with disturbances in ADNs for improved
dependability. Redundancy is the most obvious one but it is not always efficient.
More sophisticated solutions include different protection algorithms as the ones
proposed in [14], coordinated distributed generation and load control schemes
as in [47] and [60] as well as methods based on distributed storage control such
as, for example, the one proposed in [61]. Finally, methods based on online
prediction of oscillations as well as voltage sags and swell as in [62] and [63]
are also being proposed.
1.3 Proactive Management Concept
Traditional approaches to electric power grid operation are essentially reactive
and based on detect-localize-repair paradigm. If a disturbing event is detected
(e.g. a voltage sag, a frequency deviation or a line trip), a fault location is first
determined and corrective actions are taken (e.g. load shedding) to bring the
system back to a stable state and to prevent disturbance propagation. As previ-
ously pointed out, this traditional reactive approach becomes insufficient in the
face of increasing complexity, uncertainties, interdependencies as well as higher
number and new types of faults and disturbances.
With the ability to collect and to analyze increasing amount of data in real
time, we observe a rapid paradigm shift in all industrial spheres from analyzing
the past and monitoring the present, to predicting and prescribing the future (as
on the Figure 1.2 from Gartner12). For systems such as Smart Grids and others,
we used to ask questions like what happened and why it happened but now with
the ability to collect more data and with rapid processing capability, we are or
will be able to ask questions about the future: what will happen and what can we
do about it? Obviously, the level of difficulty increases but so does the expected
level of dependability, as knowing about future problems gives a possibility to
prepare for them and to handle them more efficiently.
Managing the grid proactively, in the sense of predicting future problems by
using data analytics and acting in their anticipation to prevent or to mitigate
them, may significantly improve grid’s dependability and is identified as one of
the pillars of Smart Grid’s dependability [8]. In this sense, we may differenti-
ate between two types of proactive management based on prediction of failures
[64]: predict-prevent and predict-mitigate. In the first case, after a prediction
of a failure (or a disturbance) actions are taken to avoid it. For example, in
12Gartner IT Glossary, Predictive Analytics:
http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/predictive-analytics, December 2015
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Figure 1.2. System management paradigm evolution.
a cloud environment, virtual machines may be migrated to another host when
a failure of the main host is predicted. In power systems, for example, we may
use controllable distributed generators when a voltage sag at a specific location is
predicted. This boosts availability when compared to typical reactive approaches
as downtime is, in an ideal case, fully avoided.
Still, not all problems may be anticipated in advance and prevented. In cases
when the prediction lead time is not sufficient for prevention, or when prevention
is not possible, we may still prepare the system for the recovery so as to decrease
recovery-associated downtime. For example, a cold spare might be started when
a failure of a server is predicted. In power systems, a maintenance team may be
directed to a specific location when a failure of a component is predicted. Also,
the cost of false positive predictions must be taken into account as a mitigation
triggered by a false alarm may cause unnecessary downtime.
Proactive management and predictive analytics have already found their way
to the power grid and are used for predictive maintenance [65] and mainly load
forecasting [66]. However, to the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive proac-
tive approach that specifically aims at improving availability of Smart Grids, by
predicting disturbances, has not been proposed to date.
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Massive introduction of renewable generation, market deregulation, new opera-
tion paradigms and other Smart Grid trends drive numerous changes in electric
power systems, especially at the distribution level, that result in new challenges
to Smart Grids dependability, and dependability of ADNs in particular. Hence,
with power grid’s digitalization we also need new dependability management
approaches and methods.
Efforts towards more dependable grid, that in great part rely on ICT infras-
tructure, include, among others, new demand side management programs [8] for
better power balance and real-time state estimation [29] for improved grid status
awareness, and faster and better detection of disturbances and other problems.
Complementing and extending these efforts, the goal of this thesis is to develop
a methodology and to design methods for prediction of disturbances in ADNs us-
ing voltage sags as a case study. With this we want to pave the way for proactive
management methods to additionally enhance availability of electric power de-
livery service, and thus to contribute to a more trustworthy grid. The motivation
for adopting such an approach are numerous research results in failure predic-
tion developed for industrial systems, such as, for example telecommunication
systems [67], high-performance computing systems [68], as well as commercial
computer systems that exploit predictions for enhancing availability including
IBM XIV storage system [69], IBM predictive management [70] and HP Backup
Navigator [71]. More examples of systems with proactive fault management may
be found in [72].
The backbone of the approach is in the use of accurate grid-status data (e.g.
from PMU devices whose number is steadily increasing) to predict a disturbance
and to take proactive corrective actions (e.g. with a distributed storage, a con-
trollable generator or a tap changer) to prevent it or to mitigate it.
1.4.1 Challenges
Even though it is appealing to assume that, with more ICT elements in power
grids, proactive management methods, as used in computer systems, may be
simply transferred to the new field of application, their adaptation comes with
numerous challenges:
• Identification and classification of Smart Grid faults and failures. With grow-
ing complexity and interdependency between cyber and physical Smart
Grid infrastructures and higher penetration of RES’es, the number of faults
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and disturbances is expected to increase but also new types of faults are
expected to appear. This requires to identify and to classify faults and dis-
turbances as a part of a comprehensive approach to Smart Grid depend-
ability.
• Determination of the efficiency of proactive approach for enhancing system’s
availability. Despite encouraging implementations of proactive approaches
in computer systems, there are still no models and figures of merit that
would allow to evaluate to what extent, for which failure prediction qual-
ity, and under what conditions availability of a system may be enhanced
with proactive (predictive) approaches. Such models and metrics must
be developed to determine the efficiency of proactive approaches on sys-
tem’s availability in general before proposing their application for enhanc-
ing Smart Grid’s availability.
• Development of proactive methodology and methods for fault management in
Smart Grids. A proactive fault-management methodology has to be defined
for Smart Grids and appropriate methods for prediction and mitigation of
disturbances identified. This also includes acquisition of data for prediction
algorithm training and evaluation.
• Quantification of power delivery service availability and evaluation of proac-
tive methods. Comparing the existing and the proposed Smart Grid fault-
management methods requires their evaluation with respect to availability
enhancement that has to be quantified.
In addition to these challenges, the fact that the Smart Grid as a concept is
constantly developing and improving brings new problems due to lack of depend-
ability standards in Smart Grids and standardized models for system simulation
that consider its cyber and physical aspects to allow evaluation of different man-
agement approaches. Another difficulty is that the data on disturbances in power
grids are rarely, if at all, publicly available.
1.4.2 Goals and Objectives
To tackle these challenges and problems for the sake of achieving the goal of the
thesis, we aim at meeting the following objectives that also drive the dissertation
work-flow:
1. Propose definitions for Smart Grid dependability attributes, develop taxon-
omy of faults and identify figures of merit for availability quantification.
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This should provide unambiguous communication platform between var-
ious Smart Grid communities and, along the lines of the thesis goal, it
should also help in identifying new types of faults and proper figures of
merit of grid dependability and availability in particular.
2. Develop a model and metrics to evaluate to what extent availability of a sys-
tem may be enhanced with a proactive approach and how this depends on the
quality of prediction. The model should be sufficiently general, easily ap-
plicable and understandable so as to provide better insights into the effect
of a proactive failure management on availability of a system.
3. Define a methodology for proactive management of disturbances in Smart
Grid (and Active Distribution Networks in particular) and identify methods
for the implementation. As accurate and effective disturbance prediction
is the core of the approach it deserves particular attention. This includes
identification of requirements for monitoring infrastructure, identification
and adaptation of methods for the selection of features and finally methods
for the prediction (e.g. by adopting the ones reviewed in [72]).
4. Develop and implement a simulation environment to synthesize disturbance-
related data that can be used for disturbance analysis and prediction. In the
absence of field data, generation of disturbance-related data through sim-
ulation is an alternative. In this respect, fault injection, that is used in
computer systems for the evaluation of fault-tolerance policies and predic-
tion methods [73] may be employed. Simulations must be performed for
relevant models (that also need to be defined) and for different settings
including different load and generation profiles that simulate system dy-
namics, and behavior of the systems in the presence of different types of
faults. In this regard, faults identified in the scope of the Objective 1 should
be used.
5. Case Study: Implement disturbance predictor and evaluate the approach for
management of voltage sags in Active Distribution Networks. Evaluate the
approach defined in the scope of the Objective 3 for the case of prediction
of voltage sags in distribution networks in the presence of distributed gen-
eration and variable generation and load. Use the framework implemented
in the scope of the Objective 4 for the generation of voltage sag data. Iden-
tify an appropriate mitigation mean and quantify availability enhancement
using the model from the Objective 2.
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The rest of the manuscript is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2 first basic dependability concepts as well as modeling and
evaluation methods and tools are introduced. This includes definition of
dependability attributes and figures of merit, means to attain dependabil-
ity, the fault-error-failure concept as well as a brief description of com-
monly used modeling and evaluation tools. Also, considering recent ap-
proaches based on prediction of disturbances, we present our extension of
a taxonomy of fault-tolerance policies. Then, modeling Smart Grid as a
cyber-physical system (CPS), a unified approach is taken to define its de-
pendability by combining approaches and definitions from computer and
power systems communities. A large set of previous blackouts (close to 40)
has been analyzed to identify most common root causes, to identify their
main properties and to conduct their classification in a form of a developed
taxonomy. Finally, appropriate figures of merit for quantification of Smart
Grid availability are identified.
• Related work is reviewed in Chapter 3. First a traditional approach to
power grid dependability is explained followed by an overview of recent
research in Smart Grid dependability modeling and evaluation. Proac-
tive management approaches and prediction-based methods are then re-
viewed. The section concludes with a description of relevant Smart Grid
pilot projects.
• In Chapter 4 the impact of predictive (proactive) management on avail-
ability is analyzed. First a generic model of a predictive management is
defined considering the quality of failure prediction and the cost of distur-
bance mitigation actions. Then, a metric for optimizing failure prediction
for enhanced availability is proposed and a sensitivity analysis of the ap-
proach with respect to model parameters is conducted. The main contribu-
tion of this part of the work is that the derived model and the metric may
be used to identify if a proactive approach may be applied to the specific
system and what the minimum prediction quality requirements are. Also,
derived model and equations may be used to maximize availability when
a proactive approach is used.
• A methodology and methods for online disturbance prediction are described
in Chapter 5. Also a methodology, methods and tools for the design of a
disturbance predictor are proposed.
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• Developed framework for disturbance-related data generation is described
in Chapter 6. The framework is based on simulation and fault injection
following successful examples of implementing a similar approach for syn-
thesizing failure data in computer systems for failure predictor training and
evaluation. The framework is developed as fully modular so that system
simulator, monitor and disturbance detector may be clearly distinguished.
The final output of the framework is a set of time tagged and classified in-
stances. An instance represents a set of values of selected variables (volt-
ages, phasors, etc.). Each instance may be classified as disturbance-free
or related with a specific disturbance. The generated data set must be fur-
ther conditioned before being used for training a prediction algorithm. The
same data set maybe used for training and evaluating online disturbance
detectors.
• The case study is presented in Chapter 7. We evaluate if and to what extent
voltage sags may be predicted in an Active Distribution Network (ADN). Us-
ing the developed simulation framework we first simulate behavior of an
ADN in the presence of short-circuit balanced faults that cause voltage sags
in different parts of the network. We record and condition the data so that it
may be used with the classification-based machine learning algorithms. We
then perform feature selection to identify the most indicative features and
evaluate with what quality of prediction sags may be predicted. We also
evaluate how the prediction quality varies with monitoring sampling pe-
riod, lead time and the size of the prediction window. Finally, we optimize
the prediction to maximize availability of an ADN and compare availability
gain measured with downtime decrease.
• Chapter 8 concludes the work, reviews the contributions and gives direc-
tions for the future work.
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Chapter 2
Terminology, Concepts and Taxonomies
As dependability is a mature field in computer systems with well-defined and
widely-accepted terms and terminology, basic dependability concepts, as used in
computer systems, are first introduced. This includes definitions of dependability
attributes and figures of merit, description of means to attain dependability, the
fault-error-failure concepts as well as a brief overview of commonly used model-
ing and evaluation tools. Also, considering recent approaches based on predic-
tion of disturbances, we present our extension of a taxonomy of fault-tolerance
policies.
Then, we present our unified approach to Smart Grid dependability that we
modeled as a cyber-physical system (CPS). In fact, our unified model is built by
combining approaches and definitions from computer and power systems com-
munities. A large set of reported blackouts (close to 40) has been analyzed to
identify the most common root causes, to identify their main properties and to
conduct their classification by proposing a fault taxonomy. The proposed set of
definitions and the taxonomy contribute to better communication between the
two communities as a mutual understanding platform. Also, it gives a unique
overview of the range of faults that may occur in Smart Grids and help to better
understand Smart Grid dependability threats. Moreover, the taxonomy facilitates
the application of dependability evaluation methods, such as fault injection.
Finally, appropriate figures of merit for quantification of Smart Grid availabil-
ity are identified.
A part of the work presented in this section has been published [57].
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2.1 Overview of Basic Dependability Concepts
Dependability is the ability of a system to perform a required service under stated
conditions for a specified period of time. A dependable system is the one which
delivers a required service during its lifetime.
As an umbrella term, dependability integrates the following attributes [74]:
• Availability: readiness for correct service,
• Reliability: continuity of correct service,
• Safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the envi-
ronment,
• Integrity: absence of improper system alterations, and
• Maintainability: ability to undergo modifications and repairs.
Security, that is mostly addressed separately, integrates availability, integrity
and confidentiality (the absence of unauthorized disclosure of information) [74].
An important concept in dependability is the fault-error-failure one. If a fail-
ure occurs, delivered service deviates from the correct one. An error is a deviation
of a system’s state from the correct state, and a fault is a root cause of an error
[74]. In addition, Salfner, Lenk and Malek distinguish between detected unde-
tected and detected errors (an error is undetected as long as a detector does not
identify an incorrect state) [72]. A failure of one component may also propagate
to another components or cause a fault at higher levels of system hierarchy. A
failure of a component may be a fault from the system’s point of view as long
as it does not cause deviation of the system’s state.Once activated, the fault will
cause an error that, if affecting the service provided to the user, propagates to a
failure.
According to [74], means to attain dependability include:
• Fault prevention (also called fault avoidance or fault intolerance): preven-
tion of occurrence or introduction of faults,
• Fault tolerance (FT): avoidance of service failures in the presence of faults.
Also, capability to continue the correct operation in the presence of faults,
• Fault removal: reduction of the number and severity of faults, and
• Fault forecasting: estimation of the present number, the future incidence,
and the likely consequences of faults as well as prediction of failures.
In this work, we focus mainly on fault tolerance. Considering novel tech-
niques based on online prediction of failures, we extend taxonomy of fault-
tolerance techniques, originally developed by Avizienis et. al [74]. The taxonomy
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is presented in Figure 2.1. Parts that are present in the taxonomy from [74] are
written in italics, whereas classes of techniques are presented in rectangles.
Figure 2.1. Taxonomy of fault-tolerance techniques.
Error detection may be performed concurrently or by interrupting the main
process to check the system for errors. In concurrent error detection techniques,
for example, health-status (as in [75]) or the system load (as in [76]) may be
estimated by online monitoring system parameters (also called features or vari-
ables). For a computer system and ICT components these parameters may be:
memory usage, CPU activity and temperature, disk activity, number of exceptions
or fan speed. For a power systems and its components these parameters may be
voltages, phasors, and component temperatures. Failure prediction may be per-
formed by: failure tracking, symptom monitoring, detected error reporting, and
undetected error auditing [72]. The same or a similar set of error- and fault-
handling techniques that are identified in [74] as system recovery techniques,
may be used to prevent errors and failures when triggered based on the results
of the state estimation or failure prediction. When a failure is anticipated, the
system can be prepared for a recovery. In computer systems this may be done by
creating a checkpoint on-demand, preparing a spare components, performing a
failover or by applying similar techniques. In power systems, for example, a spare
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dispatchable distributed generator may be preventively started in anticipation of
a voltage drop.
By combining FT techniques different FT techniques may be defined. In gen-
eral, fault-tolerance policies may be reactive, proactive-reactive, or proactive de-
pending if an action is taken after a failure has been detected, before a failure
(preventively) or in anticipation of an upcoming failure. Considering only tech-
niques originally presented in [74] two types of reactive fault-tolerance policies
may be defined: detection and recovery and masking and recovery 1. In the first
one, recovery actions are triggered on demand, when a failure of a component
is detected. In the second policy, errors (component failures) are systematically
masked (for example with redundancy) and recovery is performed on demand
when an error is detected. Note that different implementations of these basic
policies may also include additional, proactive actions that are performed sys-
tematically. For example, periodic checkpoints are created as a part of the roll-
back and recovery policy that is one possible implementation of a detection and
recovery policy type.
Proactive-reactive policies assume taking actions to prepare the system for
more efficient recovery if a failure occurs. A typical example of preparation and
recovery policy is checkpointing. Even though a failure will not be fully avoided,
recovery time may be shortened and availability improved.
Taking into account all FT techniques from Figure 2.1, we identify additional
types of FT policies that we presented in a form of a taxonomy in Figure 2.2.
Proactive policies can further be categorized as systematic or predictive. Sys-
tematic policies include those where actions are taken periodically, with a period
defined statically or adjusted dynamically as in [76], depending on the system
status indicators as, for example, system’s health and load distribution (e.g. as
in [77]), or after specific events (e.g. a completion of a task or a preemptive
error detection). For example, a migration to a spare server (failover) may be
performed periodically to rejuvenate the original server. Predictive policies are
based on online failure prediction and the use of prevention or preparation tech-
niques to avoid a failure or to prepare a system for recovery. In the first case,
failure-related downtime may be eliminated by failure avoidance. In the second
1A system with a masking-and-recovery policy reacts on errors (and from this perspective is
reactive) to prevent them from propagating into failures (from this perspective it is proactive).
Failure prevention in this case is based on redundancy and is implicit by the system design.
During system life, there is no need to take any actions before a failure to prevent it. This is the
main difference with respect to proactive policies as defined here and the reason for classifying
masking and recovery as a reactive policy. Another view, by which masking and recovery would
be classified as passive-proactive and other proactive policies considered here as active-proactive,
is also possible.
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case, error detection and recovery techniques still have to be used but the down-
time caused by the failure and the system recovery will usually be minimized by
the preparation. Based on this, we identify two types of predictive policies: (a)
prediction and avoidance, and (b) prediction and preparation.
Figure 2.2. Taxonomy of fault-tolerance policies.
2.2 Overview of Modeling and Evaluation Methods and
Tools
A brief overview of dependability modeling and evaluation methods and tools
is given. Interested readers are referred to [77, 78, 79] for more details. In
general, dependability models may be classified as component based and state
based. The first ones focus on system building blocks and assume that failures
and repairs of components are stochastically independent. The most commonly
used models of this type are Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) and fault trees.
An RBD reflects the structure of the system and each component is described
with its mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) and mean-time-to-repair (MTTR). MTTF is
a mean time between two consecutive failures and MTTR is a mean time needed
for the component repair. Failure and repair rates, that are usually denoted by λ
and µ, are defined as inverses of MTTF and MTTR, respectively. A fault tree is a
top-down graphical representation of the system’s structure formula so that the
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probability of higher level events can be calculated by combining probabilities of
the lower level events.
In state-based models system states are modeled, thus interdependencies be-
tween component failures may be incorporated as well. The most commonly
used ones are Markov Chain Models and Stochastic Petri Nets. Markov Chains
consist of states, transitions between the states, transition rates and initial state
probabilities. Each state may be either operational or a failure state. It is as-
sumed that the transition rates are exponentially distributed. The main problem
with Markov Chains is that the size of the model grows exponentially with the
number of components. In Petri nets, that may handle larger systems better, a
system is modeled as a directed bipartite graph.
Both types of models may be solved analytically or with commercial and
academic tools. ReliaSoft2 offers a suite of dependability modeling tools that
are widely used for commercial purposes. Two most commonly used tools in
academia are Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability and Performance Eval-
uator (SHARPE) and Stochastic Petri Net Package (SPNP). SHARPE [80] is a
general hierarchical modeling tool that analyzes stochastic models of reliabil-
ity, availability, performance, and performability. SPNP [81], allows modeling of
complex system behaviors with advanced constructs.
In this work, we mainly use Markov chains that are solved in SHARPE that
also incorporates plugins for model sensitivity analysis with respect to different
parameters. More details are given in appropriate sections.
2.3 Dependability of Smart Grids
From the infrastructure point of view, Smart Grid is the advanced electric power
grid with increased usage of cyber instruments, such as intelligent sensors, smart
meters, communication infrastructures, control algorithms, and applications, for
better management, higher efficiency, and increased dependability. Thus, it may
be interpreted as a cyber-physical system (CPS) that combines information and
communication technology (ICT) with physical elements and processes under-
neath the electric power delivery service. Electric components (conductors, ca-
pacitors, transformers, circuit breakers, etc.) that compose the power grid react
on various events in the grid, by the rules of physics, and impose changes that
also affect cyber infrastructure. Moreover, some modern components (e.g. smart
meters) may also contain logic to autonomously react to grid events. Thus, the
2ReliaSoft, http://www.reliasoft.com/products.htm
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control of the system and changes in the system are not unidirectional and gov-
erned only by the cyber infrastructure, but rather bidirectional, due to influences
and interdependencies between physical and cyber elements [51]. As for that,
Smart Grid cannot be modeled and analyzed by separately considering cyber
and physical infrastructures. Many researchers tackle this problem by focusing
exclusively on interdependencies (see, for example [51, 82, 83, 84]) but there
is still a need for a unified approach that considers all aspects of Smart Grids as
cyber-physical systems.
The main challenge for developing a unified approach is that power engi-
neering and ICT communities are both well established and have their own ter-
minologies, methodologies, models and approaches applied at different stages
of the design and implementation of a system. Even though similar models, such
as RBDs, faults trees and Markov chains are used for reliability modeling and
evaluation in both communities, approaches to dependability are essentially dif-
ferent. This also applies to different definitions of dependability attributes, the
way that faults, errors and failures are distinguished, different qualitative and
quantitative measures and fault taxonomies. While significant effort has been
made to unify definitions of dependability attributes in electric power systems
(see, for example, [85, 86, 87]) cyber aspects of the system are still not suffi-
ciently addressed.
The looming danger of merging ICT and power systems is that system’s de-
pendability may be compromised due to these differences.
2.3.1 Terminology of Smart Grid Dependability Threats
Faults, errors and failures are clearly distinguishable in ICT community as defined
in [74] and reviewed in Section 2.1. On the other hand, a number of terms, such
as incidents, perturbations, disturbances, disruptions, events, losses, adversities,
emergencies, changes, anomalies, threats, shocks, and hazards are used in power
systems to denote "disturbing events", such as voltage sags and swells, line trips,
frequency variations, etc. [50]. Most of these disturbing events that affect power
quality, may be categorized as errors but, depending on the category of the user
and the level of a disturbance, they may, from the user perspective, be observed
as failures as well. For instance, a relatively minor voltage variation can stop
a highly sensitive industrial processes, while on the other side it may not even
be noticed as a disturbance in a household. Thus, the same disturbance will
be classified as a failure in the former case and as an error in the later one. In
power systems, a failure is mainly used to describe a complete outage, when no
service is delivered to one or more users. Blackouts represent the most severe
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system failures and the total collapse of the system that causes interruption of
the service that affects all the users in an entire area [88]. It is also important to
notice that system failures are events that are observable by the customer. Thus,
if one infrastructure fails (for example, cyber infrastructure), but power is still
delivered to the customer, there is no failure of the entire system.
2.3.2 Smart Grid Dependability Attributes
To better understand dependability of Smart Girds, as cyber-physical systems, in
Table 2.1 we compare the most widely accepted definitions of major dependabil-
ity attributes and means as used in computer systems dependability (CSD) and
electric power systems (EPS) communities. Still, it should be kept in mind that
these terms are sometimes interpreted differently within the two communities
and that it may be difficult to clearly distinguish between some dependability
attributes or that their definitions overlap to some extent (for example, robust-
ness and resilience in CSD). In addition, some attributes are frequently defined
differently over the power systems community. For example, reliability and se-
curity are defined in different ways in different fields within EPS community.
Resilience is sometimes mixed with robustness which characterizes a system’s
ability to cope with a specific class of faults [50], and availability is addressed as
reliability when defining power systems reliability figures of merit in [85].
Still, having in mind definitions in Table 2.1, availability and reliability are
generally accepted similarly in both communities and those definitions could be
used when addressing Smart Grid dependability. Understanding of maintainabil-
ity in the two communities is also similar. Interestingly, fault tolerance is not a
common term in the EPS community but fault-tolerance aspects of the system are
addressed as the ability of the transmission network to keep operational after a
failure of k out of N lines is known as the N-k problem [90, 91].
In the CSD community security is defined as the system property that inte-
grates confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Considering cases of grid failures
due to cyber-attacks as, for example, those reported in [55] and [95], implies that
security as defined in CSD community should be included as a dependability at-
tribute in Smart Grids as well. On the other hand, term security in EPS com-
munity is used to describe system’s alternative configurations (that is closer to
the meaning of fault tolerance or redundancy in CSD) but also system’s ability to
smoothly make a transition to these alternative configurations in case of errors
[10]. This second aspect is considered as a part of fault-tolerance (resilience)
in CSD community. Thus, a security as defined in EPS community is covered
by resilience and redundancy. Security aspects of ICT Smart Grid infrastructure
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Table 2.1. Major dependability attributes and means as defined in computer






Continuity of the correct service. The probability that the system
will perform satisfactorily from time zero to time t, given that op-
eration commences successfully at time zero [74].
EPS
Continuity of electric service to customers, which depends both on
the availability of sufficient generation resources to meet demand
and on the ability of the transmission and distribution system to
deliver the power [10]. In a bulk power electric system: The de-
gree to which the performance of the elements of that system re-
sults in power being delivered to consumers within accepted stan-
dards and in the amount desired. The degree of reliability may be
measured by the frequency, duration, and magnitude of adverse







Readiness for the correct service. The probability that a system
is performing correctly at time t [74]. Steady-state availability is
the fraction of time a system is operational during its expected
lifetime.
EPS
The probability that a system is performing its required function









e CSD Avoiding service failures in the presence of faults [74].
EPS
The term is usually not used directly. The N-k problem [90] that
is considered as a part of reliability standards is the closest to the
understanding of fault tolerance in CSD. It is usually applies to the
transmission grid and represents the ability of an N-line transmis-






Persistence of service delivery that can justifiably be trusted, when
facing changes (unexpected failures, intrusions, accidents or in-
creased load) [92, 93].
EPS
System’s ability to reduce the magnitude and duration of the dis-
ruption [50]. The ability of the system to recover from catas-






Integrates confidentiality (absence of unauthorized disclosure of
information), integrity (absence of improper system alterations),
and availability and requires their concurrent existence [74].
EPS
The ability of the system to withstand disturbances [89]. A mea-
sure of the width of the operating envelope, or set of immediately
available operating configurations that will result in a successful







CSD Ability to undergo modifications and repairs [74].
EPS
Activity wherein a fault-free device has, from time to time, its de-
terioration arrested, reduced or eliminated [87].
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are still addressed in EPS community particularly after September 11, 2001 and
are referred to as cyber-security. In fact, numerous organizations have proposed
guidelines and standards to address cyber-security of electricity, telecommuni-
cations, transportation and other critical infrastructures [16]. However, these
are mainly addressing confidentiality, data redundancy, and protection of criti-
cal functions from cyber-attacks but do not include availability and integrity to
a sufficient extent.
Finally, the aspects of resilience as defined in EPS community are considered
as a part of fault tolerance and maintenance in CSD.
In addition, stability is an important dependability attribute used in power
systems community. In a nutshell, it describes the ability of a power system to
maintain a synchronous and balanced operating state [10]. A more comprehen-
sive definition is given in [86] where power system stability is described as "the
ability of an electric power system, for a given initial operating condition, to
regain a state of operating equilibrium after being subjected to a physical distur-
bance, with most system variables bounded so that practically the entire system
remains intact." In the same paper, a classification of power system stability, that
is presented in Figure 2.3, is performed. Definitions of power stability classes,
given in the rest of the subsection, are also adopted from [86].
Figure 2.3. Power system stability classification.
Rotor angle stability is the ability of synchronous machines of an intercon-
nected power system to, after being subjected to a disturbance, maintain/re-
store equilibrium between electromagnetic and mechanical torque of each syn-
chronous machine in the system and thus to remain in synchrony. Small-disturbance
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rotor angle stability is usually associated with insufficient damping of oscillations,
whereas transient (also called large-disturbance) rotor angle stability is associ-
ated with severe disturbances, such as a short circuit on a transmission line. Both
types of instabilities are typically short-term events that may last for a few sec-
onds to up to 20 seconds for the case of a transient instability in large systems.
Frequency stability is the ability of the system to maintain steady frequency
following a severe system disturbance that results in a significant imbalance be-
tween generation and load. Frequency instability is usually related to insufficient
generation reserve. Short frequency instabilities last for a few seconds and may
be related, for example, to islanding where one of the islands does not have suf-
ficient generation reserve. Long-term frequency instabilities may be related to
a steam turbine overspeed control or a boiler/reactor protection. They typically
last from tens of seconds up to a few minutes.
Voltage stability is the system’s ability to maintain steady voltages at all sys-
tem buses after being subjected to a disturbance, that depends on the ability to
maintain/restore equilibrium between load demand and supply. Voltage insta-
bility may occur as a progressive fall or rise of voltages of some buses (voltage
sags and swells) that may also lead to a loss of load in an area or to a voltage
collapse in a significant part of the grid. Voltage drops, which are more frequent,
may be associated with a load increase, a short on a distribution bus or a rotor
angle instability. Voltage swells are usually related to system’s inability to op-
erate below a certain load level so that generation remains significantly higher
than demand. Large-disturbance voltage stability is related to system faults, loss
of generation, or circuit contingencies. On the other hand, small-disturbance
voltage stability is related to small perturbations such as incremental changes in
system load. Short-term events last for a few seconds and involve dynamics of
fast acting load components such as induction motors, electronically controlled
loads, and high-voltage-direct-current converters. Long-term instabilities may
last for several or many minutes and, typically, involve slower acting equipment
such as tap-changing transformers, thermostatically controlled loads, and gener-
ator current limiters.
Thus, having in mind these definitions, for defining main dependability at-
tributes of the Smart Grid we propose to use definitions of these attributes as
defined in computer systems’ dependability while adding stability as an addi-
tional attribute.
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2.3.3 Taxonomy of Smart Grid Faults
Electric power system outages have been extensively analyzed, in both academia
and industry, in order to identify root causes and sequences of events that lead to
system failures (see, for example, [96] and [97]). We provide a holistic overview
of these root causes (faults) by identifying their main properties and conducting
fault classification. The taxonomy is intended to help better understanding of
the Smart Grid dependability and defining which classes of faults should be in-
cluded in system’s dependability specification. Moreover, a taxonomy may be
used when modeling and evaluating system’s fault-tolerance with, for example,
fault-injection methods. As a starting point, a taxonomy of faults for computing
systems defined in [74] is used. We extend this taxonomy, include power sys-
tem specific and interdependency faults while focusing on fault classes that were
root causes of previous blackouts. Some classes of faults that are purely related
to the computer (cyber) infrastructure and are included in [74] are omitted in
our taxonomy for the simplification reasons.
We have analyzed a number of power system failure reports and publications
related to Smart Grid dependability including [96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102,
103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113] to identify faults respon-
sible for the past outages and possible causes of future failures, and to define
a minimum set of properties for the classification of faults. Faults are classified
with respect to 14 different viewpoints in total, where each viewpoint differen-
tiates among up to four fault categories. Each combination of categories from
different viewpoints defines one class of faults, but not all combinations of cate-
gories are possible. An overview of all viewpoints and categories is presented in
Figure 2.4.
Taking a System Boundaries Viewpoint, faults are categorized as internal or
external. Internal faults are those of system components and other faults that
originate within the system boundary (e.g. an operator fault). External faults
are faults that originate outside the system boundary. In power systems, a vast
number of components’ failures are due to bad weather conditions, electrification
of animals, vandalism or other external faults [97]. Cyber-attacks are another
type of external faults that is expected to be more common in the future, as the
power grid is advancing towards the Smart Grid [55].
Infrastructure Viewpoint considers infrastructures of the Smart Grid, namely
cyber and physical. In addition, we consider protection part of the physical in-
frastructure as a separate one to distinguish between faults that occur in the part
of the system that is purely in charge of power delivery and the part related to
system dependability. Once activated, these faults will result in errors and, possi-
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Figure 2.4. Viewpoints and categories for faults classification.
bly, failures in one of the infrastructures. As described, for example in [51], these
failures may propagate and cause errors and failures in other infrastructures fi-
nally driving the system to fail. For example, during a power system blackout in
the Northeast of the United States on November 9, 1965 incorrectly set relay has
tripped a transmission line during the load increase before the maximum capacity
of the line was reached [96, 97]. An incorrect setting of the relay that belonged
to the protection infrastructure, was a fault that, after activation, resulted in an
error and a failure of the relay. This failure propagated to an error and a failure
of the line that belonged to the physical infrastructure. Thus, in this case, there
was no fault in the physical infrastructure responsible for the power delivery but
a failure propagated from the protection infrastructure. It is important to notice
that this, initial series of events, does not necessarily cause a system failure.
In addition, events in one infrastructure, that are not necessarily failures or
errors, may cause or activate faults in another infrastructure. We refer to these
faults as interdependent faults and define Interdependency Viewpoint to classify
faults as interdependent or independent. For example, going back to the same
Northeast USA blackout [96], the event in the physical infrastructure, namely an
increase of the line load has activated a dormant fault in the protection infras-
tructure, in fact an incorrectly set relay. Similarly, a cyber-attack may cause a
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failure in ICT infrastructure that may propagate to protection or physical infras-
tructures. In more generic terms, if a system is composed of two infrastructures,
A and B, from the perspective of an infrastructure A and not the entire system,
events that originate in another infrastructure B and affect infrastructure A by
creating or activating faults are external events. From the perspective of the en-
tire system, they are interdependent events and the caused or activated faults
are interdependent faults. Further classification of interdependent faults would
be also possible following a classification of interdependent failures from [51]
and [114].
Four main processes performed by the cyber infrastructure are monitoring,
communication, grid management (i.e. data processing and decision making)
and control. Each of these processes are supported by a proper hardware and
software elements that may contain a fault. Cyber-Process Viewpoint considers
this aspect to categorize faults. Further classification of faults as hardware and
software faults, that is a part of taxonomy presented in [74], is omitted for the
simplification reasons.
Electric power system structure is typically composed of four main elements:
electrical power generation, transmission and distribution and loads [10]. A fault
may originate in any of these parts and also propagate to others. In Structural
Viewpoint, faults are categorized considering this aspect. For example, a fault of
a relay in Northeast USA blackout [96] would be categorized as a transmission
fault as the relay in question physically belonged to the transmission network.
Loads are usually not under the control of a network operator but are still a
part of the system and thus, load faults that may create errors and failures of the
power system (e.g. making the grid unbalanced and causing voltage or frequency
fluctuations) are considered as internal faults and also included in this viewpoint.
In traditional reliability analysis of power systems mainly three types of faults
are considered: short circuit faults, open circuit faults and high impedance faults
[115, 116]. An open circuit fault occurs when the current flow is interrupted.
A short circuit fault (short) occurs when a connection is established between
the phases, or a phase and a ground. If these faults cause variations of voltage
or current, they will also result in errors. A high impedance fault occurs when
an energized conductor gets in contact with the ground or other environmental
objects like a tree branch. These faults are not detectable by the protection infras-
tructure as shorts, due to high impedance and relatively small current flow, but
represent a serious safety issue. Furthermore, short circuit and high impedance
faults may occur between a phase and a ground or between the phases. If all
three phases are affected symmetrically, a fault is balanced, otherwise it is un-
balanced [115]. These aspects of faults’ categorization are considered in Circuit,
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Phase and Cross-Phase Viewpoints.
A sudden increase or decrease of the load demand or a loss of a number of
loads will make the system unbalanced and, in some cases, may propagate into a
failure. Similarly, a sudden uncontrollable decrease of generation, for example in
the case of renewable resources, may cause the same effect. Finally, insufficient
spinning reserve might also get the system in unbalanced, overload, state when
the demand increases [96]. Power Balance Viewpoint classifies faults as overload
and underload faults. An overload fault occurs when the generation or reserve
cannot meet the load demand and an underload fault occurs when generation is
much higher than demand. Furthermore, an overload or underload may affect
active or reactive power.
A large fraction of failures in power systems is caused by external natural
events such as severe weather conditions, lightening, tree contacts, and ani-
mals’ electrification [97]. Other natural causes include aging of the equipment,
electromagnetic phenomena and cosmic radiation that may affect computer and
other electronic infrastructure [74, 115]. Opposite to this, many faults may be
caused by humans during any phase of system’s lifetime including design, in-
stallation, assembly, inspection, operation and maintenance [117]. From the
Phenomenological Viewpoint, faults are categorized as natural or human-made
faults. Human-made faults may be further categorized depending on the phase
of creation, objective, intention and capability.
For the sake of this taxonomy we take a simplified approach, and distinguish
only between malicious and non-malicious human-made faults in the Objective
Viewpoint. Malicious faults include acts of vandalism, terrorism and sabotages
[117] that mainly affect physical infrastructure, as well as cyber-attacks [55].
Non-malicious faults include designers’ or operators’ faults or external human-
made faults. Further categorization of human-made faults considering intent
and capability is conducted in [74].
Faults may be introduced during any phase of system’s life time, namely de-
sign and production time, runtime or maintenance time. In the Phase of Creation
Viewpoint, we differentiate between faults that were introduced during the de-
sign/implementation phase and operation phase. Design phase faults include
faults due to bad decisions, bad design, implementation bugs (e.g. software
bugs), etc. but also faults introduced during the production and implementa-
tion phase. Operation faults include all faults introduced at runtime, scheduled
maintenance or recovery period.
Moreover, human-made faults made at operation phase are further catego-
rized as configuration faults and reaction faults in the Operation Phase Viewpoint.
Configuration faults are introduced by an operator or a software and include in-
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correct setting of device parameters during normal operation or maintenance.
Reaction faults are introduced at runtime when an operator or a software reacts
improperly in a given situation or on an occurring failure and does not prevent
its propagation. For example, an incorrectly configured relay is a configuration
fault. If an operator misses the opportunity to rebalance the grid when a trans-
mission line trips, a reaction fault is activated.
Finally, faults may be permanent or temporal. Permanent faults are contin-
uous in time. For example, a natural fault during the production process that
creates a short within an electric device is a permanent fault. Temporal faults
are bounded in time. For example, a branch that connects to a transmission
line during a stormy weather is a temporal fault. This aspect is considered with
Temporal Viewpoint. Furthermore, in CSD, temporary faults are split between in-
termittent (caused within a component) and transient (caused by environment).
Both categories might be aperiodic (occur once) or periodic.
In addition to this, it is important to notice that planned (scheduled) main-
tenance frequently weakens the system. In combination with activation of other
faults, this may lead to the system failure. For example, in 2003 a high-voltage
direct current (HVDC) link between the northern Europe and the rest of Europe
was out of service for a scheduled maintenance when a 1200 MW nuclear unit in
southern Sweden went off due to a failure of a steam valve. In combination with
other, unrelated events that occurred shortly after, this resulted in a total loss of
6550 MW of load affecting 4 million people in Sweden and Denmark [97, 99]. A
series of events that occurred during blackouts in India in July 2012 also involved
scheduled maintenance [98]. These blackouts might have been prevented, if the
system was not under the maintenance when faults become active. Keeping in
mind the impact that scheduled maintenance may have on system’s dependabil-
ity, and its role in previous blackouts, we include it in the fault taxonomy as well,
but acknowledge that scheduled maintenance is not a fault.
We demonstrate how events during a blackout should be categorized, follow-
ing the taxonomy, on the example of the North American blackout that occurred
on August 14, 2003, and that affected nearly 50 million people over USA and
Canada with the total load capacity loss of 63 GW. The initiating event was the
insufficient reactive power. This fault is classified as an internal fault of phys-
ical infrastructure at generation level, human-made (due to the lack of reac-
tion), temporal, reaction fault at operation phase. In this period, state estimator,
real-time contingency analysis, energy management and control center software
failed due to activation of independent faults. All these faults are categorized
as internal, cyber faults of monitoring (or management) process at transmis-
sion level. Moreover, they are human-made, non-malicious introduced at design
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phase and permanent. Generator outage that followed shortly after is an internal
fault of physical infrastructure at generation level and so on. Line trips due to
tree contact that also occurred during this blackout, are an example of an exter-
nal fault. Observed voltage variations before the outage would be categorized
as errors, while the failure of the system occurred when the first group of users
was cut off from the power supply.
Following the same procedure we have analyzed a large set (close to 40) of
major power outages to identify and classify faults. A subset of major blackouts
is presented in Table 2.2. The table is sorted according to the total number of
people affected by a blackout. In the analysis, we rely on relevant publications or
the official post-mortem reports and official announcements of electrical power
supply companies. A classification of the most representative and frequent faults
is presented in Figure 2.5.








July 31, 2012, North and
East India
700 M 12 h - [98]
August 14, 2003, USA and
Canada
50 M - 63 GW
[96, 97,
99, 100]





November 4, 2006, Europe 15 M 2 h - [101]
March 27, 2015, Nether-
lands (Amsterdam)
3 M <5 h [56]
September 23, 2003, Swe-
den and Denmark
4 M - 6.5 GW
[96, 97,
99]
September 8, 2011, USA 2.7 M 12 h [105]
August 14, 2006, Tokyo,
Japan
1.4 M - [107]
January 16, 2007, Victoria,
Australia
480 K 2.2 GW [96, 110]
October 6, 2013 Arkansas,
USA
10 K - - [111]
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Figure 2.5. Classification of common Smart Grid faults.
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A particular challenge for the analysis was that not all the events are reported
in a uniform way and in a sufficient level of detail. As for that, a number of
different sources were combined when analyzing some of the events. Still, in
many cases some types of categorizations were not possible to conduct due to lack
of relevant information and reliable sources. For example, most of the reports do
not indicate if a fault on the transmission or distribution level was balanced or
not. Also, most of the time, it is not reported if a fault has occurred between the
phases or between a phase and the ground. For that reason, Phase and Cross-
Phase viewpoints are omitted in the table.
2.3.4 Figures of Merit of Smart Grid Availability
Metrics for quantifiable dependability attributes as used in computer systems are
given in [74]. Our interest is mainly in availability of power delivery service and
thus we focus on availability metrics. More metrics may be found in [57].
Steady-state availability is the most commonly used to evaluate service avail-
ability in computer systems. It is the ratio of system’s uptime over the lifetime. As
expressed in Equation 2.1, this may be translated in a more frequently used form
with system’s Mean-Time-To-Failure (MTTF) and Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR).
Availabil i t y “ uptime
li f et ime
“ uptime
uptime` downtime “
M T T F
M T T F `M T TR (2.1)
Even if the notion of user-perceived availability is sometimes used in com-
puter systems as different users may perceive service differently [118], to the
best of our knowledge, no user-perceived availability metrics are proposed to
the date for electric power systems.
For evaluating availability of Smart Grids, metrics proposed in [85] (even
though reliability and availability are interchangeably used in the source) seem
to be more appropriate. The most commonly used ones are System Average In-
terruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), System Average Interruption Duration Index
(SAIDI), Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI) and Average
Service Availability Index (AIDI). These are the metrics that may be used when
evaluating the effect of the proactive or other approaches on the electric power
delivery service availability. Expressions for these metrics are given in Equations
2.2 to 2.5. In addition, to evaluate availability of the entire Smart Grid, down-
time may be used a metric.
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ASAI “ CustomerHoursServiceAvailabil i t y
CustomerHoursServiceDemand
(2.5)
For individual users we may also adopt and use the above metrics from the
user perspective leading to a set of user-perceived availability metrics.
Finally, downtime may be adopted to effectively evaluate availability of a part
of the power grid from the system’s or from a user’s perspective. In that sense
a system may be considered as unavailable (down) whenever not providing a
proper power quality to a user. It should also be kept in mind that the minimum




Management of Smart Grids for enhanced dependability and better efficiency at-
tracts considerable attention in both, industry and academia. Relevant papers
and project reports are reviewed in this section. First a traditional approach to
power grid dependability is explained followed by an overview of recent research
in Smart Grid dependability modeling and evaluation. Proactive management
approaches and prediction-based methods are then addressed. The section con-
cludes with a description of relevant Smart Grid pilot projects.
3.1 Traditional Approach to Power Grid Dependability
Power system’s dependability is traditionally addressed mainly through power
grid protection (e.g. special protection schemes) [88, 115]. A protection system
is composed of relays and circuit breakers that should detect electric (physical)
failures and isolate a failed section to prevent failure propagation. These com-
ponents may also incorporate logic and make local decisions that will affect the
network topology. For example, a relay may detect a short circuit (a fault) but
also a voltage sag. Depending on the settings it may only store or send the infor-
mation for further analysis or automatically isolate a part of the grid to prevent
disturbance propagation.
When addressing dependability (in fact mostly stability as one of its attributes)
of power systems, power engineers mainly have in mind different operating
states of the system that reflect its current stability. These states are depicted
in Figure 3.1 [119].
The system is in the Normal state when it operates inside the defined stability
margins in transmission and generation so that the system can withstand a sin-
gle contingency. Alert state is characterized by insufficient stability margins and
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Figure 3.1. Power system operating states and transitions.
higher vulnerability. The system is in the Emergency state if at least one system
inequality constraint is violated. When both, equality and inequality constraints
are violated, a transition to In extremis (that is a non-operational state) occurs.
Transitions between the states occur due to component failures and restorations.
A system is in the Restorative state during a recovery and maintenance.
3.2 Smart Grid Dependability Modeling and Evaluation
With increased utilization and importance of cyber-physical systems in many
complex, safety critical, and cross-disciplinary fields, Smart Grid modeling from
CPS’es perspective emerged recently as an important research topic resulting in
a number of relevant scientific works.
Modeling of the electric power grid as a cyber-based physical system has been
proposed in [120]. The work has introduced a novel cyber-based dynamical
model whose mathematical description depends on cyber technologies support-
ing the physical system. The paper discusses how such a model could be used
to enable full observability through a cooperative information exchange among
its components. The authors also show how the proposed cyber-physical model
could be used to develop interactive protocols between the intelligent electronic
devices embedded within the system layers and the network operator. Never-
theless, due to a tremendous amount of information that will be produced and
collected, novel modeling methods for efficient integration of advanced monitor-
ing and control instruments for such cyber-physical systems are needed. These
methods should be built as compatible and scalable with the existing SCADA
systems and they should also support future industry needs.
In [121] the authors take a different approach and do not consider the entire
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Smart Grid as a cyber-physical system but, instead, CPS’es, as individual devices,
are modeled as mediators between the physical world and the business aspects of
electric power grids. Continuous evolution of embedded and ubiquitous comput-
ing technologies is perceived as a driver for decentralization of business decisions
by transferring them to computing nodes that are closer to customers.
Utilization of cyber-physical energy systems (CPES’es) for key Smart Grid
related challenges such as modeling power systems, energy efficiency, energy
resource management, and energy control are studied in [122]. The application
of CPES’es for optimal power flow management has been described for a specific
use case of a microgrid model. In line with this, some customized solutions such
as cyber-physical SCADA for the distributed energy resources management are
proposed in [123].
Considering Smart Grid as a cyber-physical system, in [51] interdependencies
between electrical and information infrastructure are qualitatively analyzed. A
model has been developed to capture the effects of failure propagation from one
infrastructure to another, distinguishing between cascading, escalating, common-
cause and unrelated failures. Each infrastructure is modeled with a set of states
that includes working state, weakened state, partial outage state, failure state,
and restauration state. A unified state model of the system is generated combin-
ing the states of individual infrastructures. Transitions between the states may
be triggered by events from one or another infrastructure and are used to model
the interdependencies. Failures of information infrastructure are classified as
masked and signaled. Errors of the information infrastructure are classified as
active and passive. Active errors are those that directly affect the electric infras-
tructure. Passive errors are those that do not affect the electric infrastructure
but make electric infrastructure errors undetectable. Malicious attacks are also
briefly addressed.
A generic guideline for developing a unified tool for the analysis of reliability
of the electric power system, having in mind the interdependencies between the
infrastructures, has been proposed in [82]. In the framework both, static and
dynamic aspects of the system are considered. A method for structural modeling
of the electric system capable to capture high-level elements, such as topology
of the system, as well as low-level ones that are associated with basic compo-
nents is proposed. The authors differentiate between two types of disruptive
events (failures), namely transient or permanent disconnection of a component
and transient or permanent overloads. Cyber infrastructure failures are summa-
rized as omission failures, time failures, value failures and byzantine failures.
Faults are not addressed. The framework also implements a few basic modeling
mechanisms.
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In [124], a quantitative modeling and analysis of reliability of Smart Grids has
been conducted with focus on transmission network. The method relies on the
analysis of previous cascading failure scenarios to group grid components into
subsystems and reduce the size of the model. The method has been extended in
[40] and [94] to analyze reliability of the grid in the presence of interdependent
failures. The focus in [94] is on the application of FACTS (Flexible Alternating
Current Transmission System) devices that may increase reliability of the grid by
controlling power flow in transmission lines. The authors evaluate the effect that
failures of FACTS devices have on the grid. Software failures of FACTS devices
are analyzed with fault injection and possible failure propagation scenarios are
identified. Faults, errors, and failures are not clearly distinguished and terms
are occasionally used interchangeably. Four types of software faults with respect
to their effect on the power flow are identified and a generic model of the grid
reliability is derived.
A few papers focus specifically on dependability of ADNs. Voltage stability in
ADNs is studied in [14]. The main conclusion of the work is that current methods
are not sufficient to cope with higher penetration of renewable resources. The
author also proposes a few novel algorithms for managing a protection system
in the presence of distributed generation for improved voltage stability. These
schemes are based on proper timing for triggering different protection means that
include shunt capacitors, DERs and online tap changers (OLTCs). The author
has demonstrated that, with a proper scheme, DERs may generally contribute to
grid’s stability.
In [5], the impact of renewable resources, storages, and demand response
programs on ADNs, and Smart Grids reliability in general, has been reviewed.
The conclusion is that, an ideal mix of Smart Grid resources may lead to its
better stability. An architectural blueprint to facilitate design, development and
integration of Smart Grid components for ensuring reliability has also been pro-
posed.
With proliferation of ICT elements, power grids are becoming more prone to
cyber-attacks and cyber-security of Smart Grids is getting more importance and
therefore being increasingly researched. The most frequent topics are intrusion
prevention, privacy, and confidentiality. A good overview of Smart Grid cyber-
security aspects including identification of security requirements, modeling of
network vulnerabilities, attack countermeasures, secure communication proto-
cols and architectures is given in [125]. The problem of propagation of faults
caused by attacks from cyber to physical infrastructure is addressed in [51].
45 3.3 Disturbance Prediction and Proactive Management
3.3 Disturbance Prediction and Proactive Management
In the sense used in this thesis, proactive operation means predicting problems
online and taking preventive actions in order to avoid the anticipated problems.
According to [8], this concept, which is identified as one of the most important
ones for enduring dependability of future power systems, considers two main
aspects - disturbance prevention (i.e. proactive disturbance management) and
asset management (i.e. predictive maintenance). In this regard, the following
areas of proactive grid management solutions are presented in [8]: 1) Decision
Support Systems (DSS’es); 2) synchrophasor solutions; 3) symbiotic integration
of synchrophasors with fast-acting controls. The proposed solutions rely on the
analysis of a combination of PMU and SCADA/EMS collected and processed grid-
related information. The usage of historical (i.e. pre-event) data is also foreseen.
The concept of prediction-based control has already found its way to power
systems through the application of a model-predictive control (MPC). The main
idea of a MPC is to predict changes in dependent variables of a dynamic system
by observing changes in independent ones and to optimize the system based on
predictions. However, this approach is not being used to predict disturbances
online but mainly to predict power imbalance. For example, in [126] a two-
stage scheduling has been proposed to optimize control of distributed resources
in ADNs. A day-ahead scheduler optimizes renewable production based on a
generation forecast and load profiles, and a 15-minutes scheduler adapts the
optimization points based on observed changes and a more accurate production
and load anticipation that further triggers control of DERs and OLTCs. A similar
approach has been taken in [127] to optimize voltage control.
Considerable research efforts have been invested in the improvement of grid’s
reliability from the perspective of efficient maintenance, coupled with maximiza-
tion of assets utilization. In particular, this concerns a shift from scheduled to
predictive grid maintenance [87]. The predictive maintenance instruments in-
clude a group of programs named Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM). In
an RCM approach, various alternative maintenance policies can be compared to
select the most cost-effective one for sustaining equipment reliability. A relevant
work on using historical data for predicting failures of aged components and sys-
tems followed by a case study on maintaining New York City’s electric grid has
been presented in [65]. The most important properties of the authors’ approach
are: that machine learning features are meaningful to the domain experts, that
the processing of data is transparent, and that prediction results are accurate
enough to support sound decision-making.
In [128], an approach to predict power grid weak points, and specifically to
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efficiently identify the most probable failure modes assuming static load distri-
bution for a given power network has been developed. The approach is applied
to two examples. The algorithm represents a power network adaptation of the
heuristic originally developed to study low probability events in physics. One
finding is that, if the normal operational mode of the grid is sufficiently healthy,
failures are relatively sparse, i.e. failures are caused by load fluctuations at only
a few buses.
Power grid disturbances are extensively analyzed from the statistical point.
For example, in [129] two methods (a method of fault position and a method of
critical distance) are proposed for stochastic prediction of voltage sags in trans-
mission networks. The methods are used to generate a voltage-sag map that
visualizes a variation of power quality through the system. For each substation,
the expected number of voltage sags per year with a magnitude of less than 85%
is calculated. When monitoring data are not available, the method of critical
distances is identified as an acceptable alternative for estimating the expected
number of sags based on the system topology. However, this and similar meth-
ods are not applicable for online prediction of disturbances but are mainly used
to identify failure-prone parts of the grid as a part of planning grid upgrades and
maintenance or to support failure localization.
With renewable generation and ADNs on one side and advances in machine
learning algorithms on the other, online predictions in power grids are becoming
more popular as means for optimal grid control. Most of the work is focused
on predicting generation from renewable resources or on prediction of demand
(load). For example, a heuristic for predicting active AC power generation of a
PV has been proposed in [130] for optimal control of microgrids. The heuristic
is based on an observed correlation between the time derivative of the active
power output and the errors caused by a generic point forecast technique. A
comprehensive survey of neural network methods for short-term load forecasting
is presented in [66]. However, it is not clear if these approaches may be used for
predicting disturbances online.
An exception is the work presented in [63]. The authors propose three meth-
ods (based on PMU voltage measurements, phase angle, and the single machine
equivalent (SIME) method) for online prediction of transient voltage sags caused
by rotor swings. Even though the quality of prediction is not quantified in ap-
propriate metrics, the results are valuable as they clearly indicate that voltage
sags of the specific type may be predicted with good lead time. Specifically, the
SIME-based methods allows early and consistent identification of critical buses
and the prediction of the voltage sag minimum value with low computational
load.
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With gradual digitalization of the grid, the main focus of most of the research
projects is on monitoring, data collection, statistical analysis and visualization
whereas advance data analytics and grid control based on these analytics are
still not addressed to a sufficient extent and are usually considered as a future
work. Probably the best known academic Smart Grid project worldwide is the
frequency monitoring network FNET/GridEye project [34, 131], in the scope
of which a wide area monitoring and data collection system have been imple-
mented. The system is based on Frequency Disturbance Records (FDRs) that
measure frequencies, phase angles and voltages at ordinary customer outlets and
provide GPS synchronization. The main advantage of FDRs is the user-friendly
installation as devices may be simply plugged into ordinary household outlets.
Still, their accuracy and the sampling rate are below of those of PMUs. More-
over, FDRs measure power quality indices only on one phase. In the scope of the
project, FDRs are mainly distributed over the US but a considerable number of
devices is installed in Europe as well. The system also implements an online vi-
sualization and allows detection of such incidents as oscillations, frequency and
angle perturbations, system failures and islanding. Prediction of instabilities is
also foreseen as a part of future enhancements. Due to the currently limited
number of FDRs, only major events may be analyzed and there is still not suffi-
cient data to perform a comprehensive analysis at the level of a single distribution
system.
Major industrial players such as Alstom and PG&E (Pacific Gas & Electric) an-
nounced to advance Synchrophasor Grid Monitoring into Proactive Grid Stability
Management [132]. In 2013, Alstom Grid collaborated with PG&E project team
to deliver enhanced e-terra integrated real-time synchrophasor and EMS appli-
cations as the first stage of the Production Grade Synchrophasor Project. This
enables PG&E to monitor power system behavior from a new class of GPS time-
synchronized, high resolution PMUs. These devices take grid measurements with
the rate of up to 120 times per second versus the traditional rate of one measure-
ment per four to six seconds with unsynchronized SCADA sensors. The increased
observability will allow PG&E to identify and to analyze system vulnerabilities
in real-time, assess available transfer margins across transmission corridors and
provide corrective actions to prevent potential blackouts. In the future, Alstom’s
Grid Stability Package will help to integrate existing measurement-based PMU
analytics, model-based EMS and dynamic stability analytics to enable proactive
management of grid stability.
Tollgade, in partnership with DTE Energy, implemented a pilot to prove the
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concept of "predictive grid" across DTE Energy’s service territory by installing
advanced monitoring equipment and predictive grid analytics software to find
tell-tale signs of faults and asset health symptoms before outages occur [133].
The preliminary results have shown that up to 86% of all outages might have
been preceded by line disturbances which is a strong motivation to apply a similar
approach to predict not only outages but also other types of disturbances such
as voltage sags.
In Switzerland, the Swiss Competence Center for Energy Research (SCCER)
has been established in 2014 with the aim of ensuring seamless transition from
centralized (that is to high extent nuclear-based) power generation to decentral-
ized generation based on renewable resources and to meet Swiss Energy Policy
2050. It is the major Swiss Smart Grid project, that brings together a number
of academic and industrial partners and is the umbrella for eight projects in the
SCCER family that address specific aspects of the future Swiss grid from energy
efficient buildings and industrial processes, to energy supply and future distribu-
tion and transmission infrastructure. For example, SCCER-FURIES1 tackles the
problem of the future Swiss electrical infrastructure with focus on topics such as:
future grid monitoring and control infrastructure, control of a large number of
DGs and distributed storages, demand side management, and standardization.
As a part of SCCER-FURIES, a grid operator Arbon Energie and Siemens (as
a grid monitoring software provider) joined their forces in Arbon Smart Grid
project2 to establish a novel Smart Grid platform for an improved utilization of
renewables coupled with DSM strategies while taking care of high standards of
power quality. Development of tools for visualization of monitored data and
provision of ancillary services based on advanced grid control are foreseen as a
part of the project extension.
Swiss Energypark has been created to support testing and validation of grid
management strategies for ADNs based on advanced monitoring and control in-
struments. A real-time monitoring infrastructure has been implemented for an
ADN at the EPFL campus [27]. A reliable monitoring system comprises 6 PMUs,
a dedicated communication infrastructure and novel algorithms for state esti-
mation. All data records are available online for research purposes. Records
are mainly used for testing and improving PMU-based state estimation algo-
rithms. Since the campus grid is designed as highly reliable and is also well
controlled, disturbances are very rare events and records do not include suffi-
cient disturbance-related data that could be used to design algorithms for their
1Future Swiss Electrical Infrastructure (SCCER FURIES), http://sccer-furies.epfl.ch/
2ArbonEnergie, http://www.arbonenergie.ch/
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prediction.
GridBox3 is an on-going industrial project that aims at providing more infor-
mation on the current state of distribution grids at medium- and low-voltage lev-
els as well as solutions for gird monitoring and control. The core of the proposed
solution is a highly distributed network of GPS-synchronized devices for real-
time measurements. Foreseen applications include grid monitoring and control,
real-time state estimation, real-time optimization, as well as automated topology
detection. Two operational pilots will be implemented as final deliverables.
VEiN4 pilot project has been realized by AEW Energie AG in Kreuzmatt in Rhe-
infelden with the aim of determining the effect of distributed generation on the
electricity quality and the operation of low-voltage networks. The distribution
system incorporates two combined heat and power units and four photovoltaics
(PVs). The grid quality is obtained from online measurements of voltages and
currents using PQ (power quality) devices that are similar to PMUs. Initial eval-
uation of recorded data indicates several voltage sags and swells mostly near PV
generation.
3GridBox - A holistic Smart Grid approach, http://www.gridbox.ch
4VEiN - Verteilte Einspeisung in Niederspannungsnetze, http://www.vein-
grid.ch/projekt.html
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Chapter 4
Proactive Management and Its Impact
on Availability
Proactive management may be adopted in different industries and for various
purposes from improving overall efficiency and performance of a system to de-
creasing operational cost. For example, proactive approach may be used to pre-
dict aging of Uninterrupted Power Supplies (UPS’es) so as to decrease mainte-
nance cost and to endure reliability at the same time [134]. Our main goal is
to use proactive management to enhance dependability and, in particular, avail-
ability of ADNs by predicting events such as disturbances and failures so that
proactive actions may be taken to mitigate them. In that sense, proactive man-
agement may be seen as proactive (predictive) fault-tolerance. As for that, with-
out a loss of generality, when talking about proactive management in the scope
of this chapter, terms predictive management and predictive fault tolerance are also
used, referring to the two predictive FT policies that have been defined in Section
2.1 (prediction and avoidance and prediction and preparation). In this chapter,
we take a generic approach and propose a model of proactive management that
may be adopted for any type of system in order to evaluate availability gain.
Intuitively, if a failure or a disturbance is predicted, and proactive actions are
performed successfully, availability will be improved in comparison to a reactive
approach based on failure (disturbance) detection and system repair. On the
other hand, a proactive action may also introduce a downtime that we refer to
as proactive action overhead. Typically, the overhead is much less than the down-
time caused by a failure and the system recovery. Thus, assuming that a failure is
predicted correctly and mitigated successfully, downtime with predictive policy
will be shorter than the reactive policy downtime and availability will improve.
We refer to this decrease of downtime as a reward. Nevertheless, as there is no
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perfect oracle, not every failure can be predicted. Also, there is no guarantee of
a successful mitigation. For example, if a system is already in a contaminated
state when a failure is predicted, the failure might be inevitable. Furthermore,
a failure might be (incorrectly) predicted even when it is not imminent. Such
a false alarm will still trigger a proactive action that will introduce unnecessary
overhead that we call penalty. For example, in power systems, if a voltage drop
is predicted, a shunt capacitor, a solid-state transformer or a DER may be used
to boost the voltage just before the expected drop. This will keep the voltage
within defined limits in the cause of a correct prediction. But, if the prediction
was incorrect, the proactive action will case overvoltage at a specific point that
may propagate through the network and cause additional problems.
In conclusion, on one hand, predictive management may enhance availabil-
ity but, on the other hand, unsuccessful mitigation and low quality of failure
prediction may even result in decrease of availability. For example, it has been
observed in [68] that a predictive policy for a high performance computing sys-
tem may increase a task execution time by up to 10% when failure prediction
quality is low. Despite a number of implementations of predictive fault toler-
ance, mostly in computer systems, there is still a need to further investigate a
tradeoff between reactive and proactive methods and to provide an analytical
model for availability with proactive management. In particular, it is not clear
to what extent availability may be enhanced with a proactive FT, how this effect
can be modeled, what the minimum requirements for the prediction quality are
(in terms of precision and recall), and how failure prediction can be optimized
so that availability enhancement is maximized.
To address these problems and to confirm if proactive approach may indeed
be used for management of disturbances and failures in Smart Grids and other
systems, we create a generic analytical model of predictive FT that may be used
to quantify availability gain for various types of systems. This helps designers
to quickly estimate availability with predictive and reactive policy and to select
the optimal one for the improving availability of a specific system with available
failure prediction mechanisms.
To model availability in a comprehensive way, we create a unified Markov
chain that incorporates both types of predictive FT policies. Using the model we
analyze the effect of a predictive FT on availability and extend the steady-state
availability equation so that it includes the model parameters. As, in some cases,
it may be possible to change the quality of failure prediction by manipulating
prediction parameters, we also derive an A-measure to optimize failure predic-
tion for maximizing availability. We provide guidelines for availability equation
and the A-measure application. To evaluate the approach we analyze availability
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improvement of a virtualized server with predictive FT and conduct sensitivity
analysis of the equation and the Markov model to identify the variables that af-
fect availability the most. We then perform Matlab simulations to validate the
model accuracy.
In the analysis we focus on computer systems due to higher availability of
component failure rates and failure prediction quality data but the generated
model and the guidelines are universal and may be used for other types of sys-
tems such as Smart Grid and its parts.
A part of the work presented in this section has been published in [135].
4.1 Model of Proactive Management
We first derive a model of failure (disturbance) prediction, identify prediction
quality metrics and derive a model of proactive (mitigative) actions. We then
generate Markov models for the two types of predictive (proactive) management
policies. Starting from these models we derive a generic Markov model of a
predictive management that we use to extend steady-state availability equation.
4.1.1 Failure Prediction Model and Quality Metrics
The goal of failure (disturbance) prediction is to predict, with sufficient lead
time, whether a failure will occur in a certain time period that is referred to as a
prediction window. A predictor should predict as many failures as possible while
keeping the number of incorrect predictions to the minimum. The output of a
failure prediction can be categorical (Boolean) if it forecasts whether a failure will
occur or not, or numerical if a probability of a failure imminence is estimated. By
setting a prediction threshold, so that a failure is predicted when the probability
is above the threshold, a probabilistic output can be translated into categorical.
Depending on the result of failure prediction and its actual occurrence in the
prediction window, a prediction may be true-positive (when a failure is predicted
and it also occurs), false-positive (when a failure is predicted but does not occur),
true-negative (when no failure is predicted and none occurs) or false-negative
(when no failure is predicted but it occurs), as summarized in Figure 4.1.
Different metrics may be used to evaluate a failure predictor but, as failures
are relatively rare events, precision and recall are identified as the most appropri-
ate ones [72]. If the total number of true-positive, false-positive, true-negative,
and false-negative predictions is denoted by ntp, nfp, ntn, and nfn respectively, the
54 4.1 Model of Proactive Management
Table 4.1. Failure prediction contingency table.
total number of failures is nf, and the total number of alarms na, then precision
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nt p ` n f n (4.2)
If ntp equals zero, both precision and recall are zero. If the number of alarms
is zero, precision is set to one by convention. If the number of failures is zero,
recall is undefined. This last case will not be considered as a hypothetical system
that never fails is fault-free and needs no fault tolerance.
In an ideal case, both precision and recall are equal to 1. In practice, they
are related and one measure may frequently be improved at the expense of the
other. In fact, for different predictor configurations, different precision-recall
pairs can be obtained but, as also observed in [136], prediction with high pre-
cision usually has low recall, and vice versa. The relation may be depicted in a
precision-recall curve as the one in Figure 4.1. When the output of a prediction
is numerical, the relation between precision and recall can be tuned by chang-
ing the prediction threshold. Typically, higher threshold causes higher precision
and lower threshold causes higher recall. In Figure 4.1, Threshold 1 is greater
than Threshold 2. In classification and prediction algorithms, finding an optimal
precision-recall trade-off is frequently done with F-measure, which is a harmonic
mean of precision and recall. As it will be demonstrated later, F-measure might
not be the most appropriate one when the objective is availability maximization.
In fact, as also pointed out by [137], abstract metrics such as F-measure are good
for benchmarking and comparing prediction (machine-learning) algorithms but
they unfortunately ignore problem-specific details. As such, these metrics say
nothing about a practical impact of the algorithm and how efficiently the prob-
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lem in hand is solved. Thus, there is a need for metrics that also incorporate
problem-specific attributes such as the cost of an incorrect prediction.
Figure 4.1. An example of a precision-recall curve.
If a predictor is running on the system for which it is predicting failures, then
it may also introduce additional load that depends on the computational com-
plexity of the prediction algorithm. For example, we may expect a load increase
of about few percents with a relatively simple algorithm as the one from [67] or
a significant increase when a more complex prediction (e.g. the one proposed
in [138]) is used. To capture failure rate increase caused by higher load we
introduce failure rate increase factor as a parameter of failure prediction.
4.1.2 Proactive Action Model
Proactive actions are taken either to avoid failures or to decrease the failure
recovery time by preparing for it in advance. A proactive action may be modeled
with action latency, action overhead, and success probability. The latency is the
total time needed to perform an action and the overhead is the time during which
the execution of the main process (and more generally a delivery of a service to a
user) may be interrupted. In other words, the overhead may cause a downtime.
Note that prediction lead time should not be shorter than the action latency.
The case of live migration of virtual machines (VMs) studied in [139] may
serve as an example of a proactive action in computer systems. Two stages of live
VM migration are identified: preparatory and blackout. In the preparatory stage,
parts of VM are migrated while keeping the VM running on the original node,
and in the blackout stage, dirty pages are copied from the source to the target
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node while interrupting VM execution. In this case, latency is the sum of the
preparatory and the blackout stage time, and overhead (downtime) corresponds
to the blackout stage. Success probability describes a probability that a failure is
avoided or that the system is prepared for the recovery with a proactive action.
In power systems, for example when a DER is used to increase a voltage at
the connection point in an anticipation of a voltage sag, the latency is the time
needed to start a DER whereas, for this particular case, the overhead is zero.
4.1.3 Models of Predictive Policies
A continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) model of a prediction and avoidance
fault-tolerance policy is presented in Figure 4.2a. Parameters λ, µ, P, R, a, and c
stand for: failure rate, repair rate, precision, recall, failure rate increase factor,
and proactive action success probability, respectively. Failure and repair rates are
those of the system with only reactive policy and equal 1/MTTF and 1/MTTR,
respectively. Parameter α is the alarm rate and can be expressed as (R/P)(1+a)λ,
whereas γ is a proactive action completion rate that equals 1/overhead.
Figure 4.2. Markov models of two predictive fault-tolerance policies (a) pre-
diction and avoidance and (b) prediction and preparation.
Unpredicted failures bring the system to the Repair state at the rate (1-R)(1+a)λ.
Alarms (true-positive and false-positive predictions) bring the system to the Avoid-
ance state at the rate α. A transition from the Avoidance state to the Up state
occurs at the rate (1-P)γ + cPγ. This corresponds to the cases of false-positive
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predictions and successful failure avoidances when a prediction is true-positive.
When a failure is correctly predicted but unsuccessfully avoided, a transition from
the Avoidance to the Repair state occurs at the rate P(1-c)γ. We neglect transi-
tions from the Avoidance state to the Repair state for the cases when another
failure occurs during the proactive action overhead time assuming γ»λ.
A CTMC model of a prediction and preparation fault-tolerance policy is pre-
sented in Figure 4.2b. The difference with respect to the model from Figure
4.2a, apart from the naming of the states, is that correct prediction and success-
ful preparation brings the system to the Prepared Repair state at the rate c*P*γ.
As the system is prepared for the recovery, mean time spent in the Prepared Re-
pair state (MTTRp) is shorter than MTTR. The rate δ, that is a transition rate
from the Prepared Repair state to the Up state, equals 1/MTTRp.
Solving the models from Figure 4.2 for the system steady state, one can derive
two different steady-state availability equations for the two types of predictive
FT. Deriving a generic availability equation requires introducing two additional
parameters, penalty and reward. Penalty corresponds to introduced downtime
when the action was needless or unsuccessful and reward is a downtime decrease
in the case of a correct prediction and successful proactive action. To illustrate
the impact of these parameters more precisely, we compare availability and un-
availability time periods of systems with reactive and the two types of predictive
fault tolerance policies considering the four cases of a prediction.
System availability for the case of a true-positive prediction assuming a suc-
cessful proactive action is depicted in Figure 4.3. Lightning symbol indicates a
failure occurrence time and an alarm (a bell symbol) indicates a failure predic-
tion time. For simplicity, we assume that a proactive action is initiated as soon as
a failure is predicted as the time needed to initiate the action may be considered
as a part of the action latency. The system is unavailable when under a recovery
or during a period that corresponds to the proactive action overhead. We define
reward, for the case of a prediction and avoidance policy as MTTR - overhead,
and for the case of a prediction and preparation policy as MTTR - (overhead +
MTTRp).
In the case of a false-positive alarm, preventive actions are still initiated when
an alarm is raised even though the action is needless. Thus, for both types of
predictive policies, system states will be identical to the ones depicted in Figure
4.3b. Penalty is equal to the overhead in this case. If a failure is not predicted,
but still occurs (false-negative prediction), the same scenario as in the case of
reactive policy applies. When prediction is true-positive but a proactive action
is unsuccessful, the system unavailability period equals the sum of the penalty
(that equals to the overhead) and MTTR.
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Figure 4.3. System availability for the case of a true-positive alarm and suc-
cessful proactive action for (a) reactive, (b) prediction and avoidance, and (c)
prediction and preparation fault-tolerance policies.
We include these parameters and derive a unified Markov model of proactive
fault-tolerance policies that we also compare to the models from Figure 4.2 to en-
sure equivalence. Parameters γ and δ from Figure 4.2 may be expressed in func-
tion of penalty, reward and MTTR. As before, we assume transition rates from
any other state to the Up state are much higher than 1/MTTF so that additional
failures do not occur while the system is unavailable. The model is depicted in
Figure 4.4 with states described in Table 4.2.
Thus, predictive FT policies may be generically modeled with prediction 1)
precision (P) and 2) recall (R) of failure prediction, 3) penalty (p) and 4) reward
(r), 5) proactive action success probability (c) and 6) failure rate increase (a).
In addition, the availability model has to include MTTF and MTTR of the same
system when only a reactive policy is implemented.
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Figure 4.4. Unified Markov model of predictive fault-tolerance policies.
Table 4.2. Description of the unified Markov model states.
State ID Description
R Recovery state.
NPA State caused by needless proactive actions due to a
false-positive alarm.
SPA State caused by a true-positive alarm and a successful
proactive action.
UPA State caused by a true-positive alarm and an
unsuccessful proactive action.
4.2 Optimizing Prediction for Enhanced Availability
Steady-state availability, that is simply a ratio of system’s uptime over the lifetime
is the most frequently used to quantify availability of a system that implements a
reactive FT policy. We fist extend this equation for the case of a predictive policy
and then derive a measure and provide a guideline for maximizing availability
by tuning failure prediction quality.
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4.2.1 Steady-state Availability Equation
By analytically solving the generic model for the steady state, a steady-state avail-
ability equation for the case of a predictive FT policy is derived in Equation 4.3.
Non-capital ’r’ stands for reward, whereas ’p’ stands for penalty. Other symbols
are used as before. Availability of the same system with a reactive policy is simply
the ratio between MTTF and (MTTF+MTTR). A less comprehensive version of
Equation 4.3 can be derived without a Markov model by only considering cases
from Figure 4.3 as we did in [135]. Equation 4.3 can be presented in a more
compact and well-known form as in 4.4 with MTTFp defined by Equation 4.5
and MTTRp defined by Equation 4.6.
Ap “
M T T F
1` a
M T T F
1` a `M T TR´ R ˚
´
c ˚ r ´ `p1´ cq ` 1´ P
P
˘ ˚ p¯ (4.3)
Ap “
M T T Fp
M T T Fp `M T TRp (4.4)
M T T Fp “ M T T F1` a (4.5)
M T TRp “ M T TR´ R ˚
´
c ˚ r ´ `p1´ cq ` 1´ P
P
˘ ˚ p¯ (4.6)
The equations apply when precision is non-zero. The precision is zero only
when the number of true-positive predictions is zero, in which case recall is zero
as well. With such a prediction no failures can be anticipated, and predictive FT
that relies on it makes no sense. If recall tends to zero due to a high number
of failures and a small number of true-positive predictions, availability improve-
ment will be negligible. If precision tends to zero, the expression in parenthesis
in Equation 4.3 becomes negative and availability decreases.
In a simplified case, when the failure rate increase factor and the success rate
can be neglected (a=0 and c=1), the break-even point can easily be derived.
It defines the minimum requirement for the failure prediction quality so that
availability improves with respect to the system with a reactive policy, and is
defined by Equation 4.7. It is interesting to notice that the break-even depends
only on precision but not on recall. However, the scale at which availability
improves depends on recall as well.
In a realistic case, when a>=0 and/or c<=1, the inequality 4.7 still has to
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hold but, in this case, it is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for a
predictive policy to improve availability over a reactive one.
P ě penal t y
penal t y ` reward (4.7)
4.2.2 A-measure and Prediction Optimization
In practice, finding a trade-off between precision and recall is frequently done
with F-measure [140] (also called F-score), which is a harmonic mean of precision
and recall. However, this is appropriate only for the case of classification algo-
rithms when the number of instances of two classes is balanced. This is not the
case with failure prediction as there are typically significantly more non-failure
than the failure instances. In fact, the optimization function should be driven by
the application requirement that, in our case, is availability maximization. For
the optimization of prediction to maximize availability, we introduce A-measure
that is defined by Equation 4.8. The measure actually represents a relative MTTR
decrease with respect to a reactive policy. The trade-off between precision and
recall should be such that A-measure is maximized in order to maximize availabil-
ity assuming the success factor is defined and that a prediction precision-recall
curve is known.
Ameasure “ R ˚
´
reward ˚ c´ `p1´ cq ` 1´ P
P
˘ ˚ penal t y¯ (4.8)
In order to apply the equations and to find an optimal precision-recall pair,
model parameters and the precision-recall curve have to be estimated. In a more
favorable case, the system is already operational with a reactive policy, and er-
ror logs and system parameters that are needed for the specific failure predictor
are recorded and stored. In the other case, it must be possible either to run
experiments on the same or a similar system in order to obtain the data or to
simulate the system. By running a prediction on the recorded data set and chang-
ing prediction parameters (e.g. prediction threshold in the case of a numerical
predictor), different precision-recall pairs can be obtained and a precision-recall
curve derived. MTTF and MTTR can be obtained from error logs by considering
time stamps. Penalty, that is essentially the action overhead, can be derived by
running a proactive action, for different system configurations, and finding an
average system unavailability period during the action execution.
Estimating reward, the rate increase factor, and the success probability, re-
quires to run experiments on the system with failure prediction. The rate in-
crease factor can be simply derived by comparing MTTF of the system without
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failure prediction and with failure prediction but without taking any proactive
actions. Alternatively, for computer systems, when the load increase is known, a
model from [141] may be used to estimate a failure rate increase. To estimate
success probability and reward more accurately, a large number of true positives
is required. To accelerate their estimation, failure prediction should be set such
that recall is high. This will increase a probability of both true-positive and false-
positive predictions.
We will first consider the case of a prediction and avoidance fault-tolerance
policy. Let the total number of alarms during the experiment, which corresponds
to the sum of true-positive and false-positive predictions, be na. Furthermore,
let the total number of observed cases when a failure is predicted and it also
occurs, that corresponds to a correct prediction and unsuccessful avoidance, be
npf. If ntp is the number of true-positive predictions during the experiment, then
npf=(1-c)ntp. As precision and recall are predefined for this set of experiments,
ntp can be expressed as a product of precision and na and the proactive action
success probability derived as c=1-(npf/(P*na)). Reward is simply the difference
between the MTTR without failure prediction and the penalty.
For the case of prediction and preparation policy, success probability can be
derived in a similar manner with a difference that the case of a correct predic-
tion and unsuccessful proactive action is recognized when the downtime associ-
ated with system repair equals MTTR. The cases when a failure is predicted and
the repair time is shortened correspond to a correct prediction and successful
preparation. If an average repair time for these cases is MTTRp, then reward is
MTTR-(penalty+MTTRp).
Alternatively, when experiments and simulations cannot be performed, one
may still analyze system’s availability with or without predictive fault tolerance
and identify optimal precision and recall. This can be done by estimating model
parameters while considering similar systems described in the literature and dif-
ferent phases of recovery and proactive actions that contribute to MTTF, MTTR,
penalty and reward.
Once the parameters are estimated, the procedure for finding an optimal
trade-off, between precision and recall with respect to A-measure, is rather straight-
forward and similar to the one used to finding the maximum F-measure. In this
case, for each point in the precision-recall curve, A-measure has to be calculated
to find the maximum. When precision-recall curve can be approximated with a
mathematical function, an optimal point may be found by expressing precision
as a function of recall (or vice versa), inserting this relation into Equation 4.8,
and finding the maximum of the A-measure using a derivative.
The availability equation can be applied to the entire system or only to one or
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more components depending on the type of failures that can be predicted. In the
first case, Equation 4.3 may be applied directly. In the second case, availability
model of the system has to be first derived (e.g. a Markov chain or a Reliability
Block Diagram) and equivalent MTTF and MTTR of a component(s) calculated
following Equations 4.5 and 4.6. A similar procedure applies when only one
type of system or component failures can be treated proactively. For example, if
only software failures of a server can be predicted, then a Markov model of the
system with a reactive policy can be generated so that server software failures
are modeled with a separate system state with appropriate transitions rates from
the "Up" state to the "Down" state that correspond to 1/MTTFssf and 1/MTTRssf
("ssf" stands for "server software failure"). Then, to evaluate availability of the
system with a predictive policy, MTTFssf and MTTRssf have to be substituted with
appropriate measures following Equations 4.5 and 4.6 and the entire Markov
model has to be reevaluated.
4.3 Model Validation
To validate the model and to demonstrate the application of the derived generic
Markov model and the equations, as well as to analyze sensitivity of system’s
availability with respect to different model parameters for the two types of pre-
dictive fault-tolerance policies, we consider a simple virtualized server system.
4.3.1 System Structure and Parameters
As, in this type of computer systems, host (hardware) failures are identified to
be among the most frequent and severe ones [142, 143] with host’s MTTF and
MTTR having a large effect on system’s availability [67], we analyze availability
of the server infrastructure to understand to what extent it may be improved with
predictive FT and under what conditions. The system is composed of the main
server, a cold spare and a shared external storage. It also supports live virtual
machine migration. The structure of the system is depicted in Figure 4.5.
Initially, the system uses a reactive failover policy with checkpoint-recovery
mechanism. A checkpoint is created periodically on the external storage that may
be accessed from both hosts. A checkpoint saves an entire VM state. Another VM
is started on to the spare host when a failure of the main host is detected, and
the computation continues from the latest checkpoint. Once the failed host is re-
paired it takes the role of a spare. For the simplification we assume that MTTF »
MTTR and that no host failures occur while the other one is being repaired. This
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Figure 4.5. Structure of the analyzed virtualized server system.
is also a frequent practice in analysis of similar systems. In the prediction and
avoidance policy a live migration of VM is initiated when a failure of the main
host is predicted. In the prediction and preparation policy, a new checkpoint
is created as soon as the host failure is predicted and offline migration of VM
from the failed host to the spare one is conducted after a failure is detected. We
assume that the lead time equals 5 minutes as in [67] that considers a commer-
cial telecommunication server system. Also, we assume that a similar prediction
method as in [67], which has low computational over-head and good prediction
quality is implemented. A sufficient lead time improves proactive action success
probability and low overhead ensures a small increase in failure rate. On the
other hand, increased lead time may cause a decrease in the quality of predic-
tion [67, 144].
To create as realistic and as generic model of a server system as possible,
host failure parameters and the success probability are adopted from [145] and
adapted for the selected system, time-aspect parameters of live VM migration
from [80, 139, 146, 147] , and checkpointing parameters from [148, 149]. Other
parameters estimation is based on empirical knowledge. A generic Markov model
from Figure 4.4 is analyzed with the Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability
and Performance Evaluator (SHARPE) [80] and results are compared against
Equation 4.3 to ensure equivalence. Table 4.3 summarizes system parameters.
The first part of the table contains the data obtained from the literature and
the calculated model parameters for the case of the reactive policy. MTTR (for
the reactive policy) is the sum of mean values of failure detection time (MTTFD),
migration latency (MML) and system recovery time with periodic checkpointing
(MRTpcp). Failure rate increase factor is set to a rather high value (10%) in or-
der to include even a case when failure prediction introduces great load to the
system. In practice, we may expect failure rate increase of only a few percents.
Predictive policies parameters are presented in the second part of the table and
are calculated following the equations given in the second column.
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MTTF Mean-Time-To-Failure 1000 h
MTTFD Mean-Time-To-Failure-Detection 30 s
MML Mean-Migration-Latency 20 s
MMO Mean-Migration-Overhead 5 s
MRTpcp Mean-Recovery-Time (periodic checkpoint) 8 min
MRTodcp Mean-Recovery-Time (on-demand checkpoint) 4 min
MCPO Mean-Checkpoint-Overhead 10 s
MTTR = MTTFD + MML+ MRTpcp 530 s
MTTRpp = MTTFD + MML + MTRodcp 290 s
c Proactive action success probability 0.90





penaltypa = MMO 5 s
rewardpa = MTTR - MMO 525 s
Pbreakeven-pa Approx. break-even point (See 4.7) 0.0095
penaltypp = MCPO 10 s
rewardpp = MTTR - (MTTRpp + MCPO) 230 s
Pbreakeven-pp Approx. break-even point (4.7) 0.0416
For the prediction and avoidance predictive policy (subscript "pa" is used to
indicate policy parameters), assuming that prediction lead time is greater than
the migration latency, penalty equals the migration overhead (that corresponds
to the VM live migration blackout stage), and reward is the difference between
the MTTR and the migration overhead. For the prediction and preparation pol-
icy (subscript "pp" used to indicate parameters), with the same assumption for
the lead time with respect to checkpoint latency, penalty equals checkpoint over-
head (MCPO). As checkpoint is created closer to the failure, recovery time is
decreased to MRTodcp, and mean-time-to-repair becomes MTTRpp. It is interest-
ing to observe that the minimum precision for which a proactive policy is superior
over the reactive (the breakeven point) is very low for the case of both predictive
policies. The reason is that the rewards are much higher than the penalties.
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4.3.2 Availability with Reactive and Proactive Policies
Steady-state availability for the range of values of precision and recall between
0.001 and 1 is depicted for the prediction and avoidance, and for the prediction
and preparation policy in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 respectively. A solid line on
the top surface in the figures applies to the precision-recall curve from Figure
4.1. For the comparison, availability of the system with a reactive policy is also
presented. A breakeven precision value (see Equation 4.7) is where the two
surfaces in figures intersect.
Figure 4.6. Availability of the server infrastructure with prediction and avoid-
ance, and reactive policies as a function of prediction quality.
Thus, when the prediction quality is such that precision is above the breakeven
point - proactive policy is superior over the reactive one, and vice versa. Note
that two predictive policies have different penalty and reward values, so that the
range of availability that can be achieved varies differently with changing pre-
cision and recall. It is interesting to observe that the availability of a proactive
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Figure 4.7. Availability of the server infrastructure with prediction and prepa-
ration, and reactive policies as a function of prediction quality.
system increases/decreases with the increase of recall, depending on whether
precision is above/below breakeven line or not. For the selected parameters and
a perfect failure prediction (P = R = 1), we compare steady-state availability,
steady-state unavailability, and downtime per year for the server infrastructure
with reactive and the two type of predictive policies. Results are presented in
Table 4.4.
With the prediction and avoidance policy, unavailability reduces by a factor
of almost 74 times, and with the prediction and preparation policy, unavailability
is almost halved. Thus, even with highly reliable components, such as a server
with MTTF of 1000 h, availability of the server system may still be additionally
improved with a predictive FT policy if prediction quality is high.
The improvement effect is even more evident when reliability of the server is
lower. In practice, a typical MTTF of a server is about 20 days that is, approxi-
mately, 500 h. In this case, availability with a reactive policy is 0.999705. With
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Table 4.4. Availability of different policies with perfect failure prediction.
Policy type Availability Unavailability Downtime per year
Reactive 0.999853 147*10-6 1h 17 min
Prediction and
avoidance
0.999998 2*10-6 1 min
Prediction and
preparation
0.999915 85*10-6 44 min
predictive policies, availability reaches 0.999991 for the prediction and avoid-
ance policy and 0.999830 for the prediction and preparation policy. This corre-
sponds to reducing downtime over one year from 1 h and 17 min, to only 1 min
with prediction and avoidance (unavailability reduced by a factor of 73) and to
44 min with prediction and preparation policy (unavailability reduced by a factor
of 1.7).
As a more realistic scenario, when failure prediction is not perfect, we con-
sider the case of a precision-recall curve from Figure 4.1. For the purpose of a
simplified application of the A-measure, we approximate the curve with a func-
tion P = 1 - R3. We depict, with solid lines on the higher surfaces in Figure 4.6
and Figure 4.7, how availability changes with respect to the model parameters
from Table 4.3 and the approximated curve from Figure 4.1. In fact, the lines
are projections of the approximated precision-recall curve on the availability sur-
face. With the approximated curve, the optimal precision-recall trade-off may be
derived by a substitution of precision in Equation 4.8 by P = 1 - R3, and finding
a derivative of Equation 4.8 with respect to recall with other parameters taken
from Table 4.3.
Availability, unavailability, downtime per year, and downtime decrease with
respect to the reactive policy, for optimal precision-recall point obtained by using
A-measure are presented in Table 4.5. Unavailability and downtime decreases
are not as high as in the case of a perfect failure prediction but are still significant.
For example, with the prediction and avoidance policy unavailability reduces by
a factor of almost 4.5 times, and downtime over one year is decreased by 1h
when compared to the reactive policy (see Table 4.4 for availability with reactive
policy). As a comparison, we also present the values of availability measures
obtained with F-measure as well as identified precision and recall values. The
results clearly demonstrate superiority of the proposed A-measure when it comes
to availability improvement.
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Downtime per year [h] 17 min 34 min







Downtime per year [h] 58 min 63 min
Downtime decrease [h] 17 min 14 min
Precision 0.3292 0.6856
Recall 0.8754 0.6800
To understand how the effect of predictive policies on availability changes
with server’s reliability, we consider a range of MTTF from about 10 days to
100 days (more precisely from 250 h to 2500 h). Steady-state availability and
downtime decrease per year are depicted in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 for the
three types of policies. Precision and recall is optimized with A-measure.
Availability is always higher using either type of predictive policy than with
the reactive policy. As one may expect, prediction and avoidance policy, that, for
the analyzed case, has higher reward and lower penalty, also has higher avail-
ability. When MTTF is 2500 h, availability with the reactive policy is 0.999961.
The same availability level may be reached with prediction and avoidance policy
when MTTF is even 5 times smaller and equals to 500 h. Moreover, it may be
observed that availability and downtime are affected less by changes in MTTF
when one of the predictive policies is used. We have analyzed availability and
downtime also for the case when success rate is only 0.6 and failure rate increase
factor is 0.2. Even in such an extreme case, predictive policies still have higher
availability and lower downtime than the reactive one.
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Figure 4.8. Impact of MTTF on steady-state availability.
Figure 4.9. Impact of MTTF on downtime per year.
4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We further analyze the effect that changing different system parameters has on
availability by conducting sensitivity analysis. We use scaled differential sensitiv-
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ity analysis as described in [145]. In the essence, considering a model of N input
parameters xi (i = 1..N) and an output Y, first a sensitivity of the output with
respect to each parameter xi, namely Sxi(Y), is calculated as a partial derivative
of Y with respect to xi. Then, scaled sensitivity is derived by scaling sensitivity
with the ratio of the nominal value of the parameter to the nominal value of the
output. Scaled sensitivity rank (SSx) for each parameter is defined as the value
of a scaled sensitivity with nominal values of parameters.
Sensitivity analysis is performed for the steady-state availability of the generic
Markov model of a predictive fault-tolerance policy, using a SHARPE package for
the sensitivity analysis developed in the scope of [145]. The analysis is conducted
with respect to the parameters: MTTF, MTTR, precision, recall, penalty, reward,
a, and c. Nominal values for the parameters are adopted from Table 4.3, and
precision and recall nominal values are the ones from Table 4.5 when A-measure
is used for optimization. Sensitivity analysis of system’s availability with a reac-
tive policy with respect to MTTF and MTTR is also conducted. Values of scaled
sensitivity ranks are presented in Table 4.6. Negative value of sensitivity rank
implies that the function decreases with an increase of the parameter. A zero
value implies that the output is not sensitive to the parameter change.
Table 4.6. Sensitivity analysis results.
Scaled Sensitivity Rank of System’s
Steady-state Availability
Parameter (x) SSx(Ar) SSx(Apa) SSx(App)
MTTF 1.15*10-4 1.94*10-5 9.77*10-5
MTTR -1.15*10-4 -1.49*10-4 -1.49*10-4
precision 0 8.24*10-6 7.83*10-6
recall 0 1.29*10-4 5.09*10-5
penalty 0 -6.93*10-6 -5.38*10-6
reward 0 1.36*10-4 5.63*10-5
a 0 -1.92*10-7 -9.68*10-7
c 0 1.37*10-4 5.87*10-5
As previously observed, availability is becoming less sensitive with respect
to the change of MTTF with predictive policies as the rank changes from the
order of 10-4 with a reactive policy, to the order of 10-5 with a predictive one. In
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practice this means that reliability of a component will affect system’s availability
to a lesser extent. It is also interesting to observe that sensitivity is different for
the two proactive policies. Namely, availability is less sensitive to the change
of MTTF in the case of prediction and avoidance than in the case of prediction
and preparation policy. This may be explained with a difference in penalties and
rewards for the two policies (see Table 4.3). In particular, reward is more than
two times higher in the case of prediction and avoidance policy when compared
to the prediction and preparation one that makes it more resilient to the increase
of MTTF as, with a good recall, the effect of MTTF change on availability is
lower. Sensitivity with respect to MTTR remains almost the same regardless of
the policy.
For the both predictive policies, availability is more sensitive to the change
of recall than to the change of precision. As in the case of MTTF, it is interesting
to observe how different sensitivity for the case of the two proactive policies to
the change of recall is. Again, this may be explained with significantly different
rewards. Namely, reward in the case of the prediction and avoidance policy is
525 s, whereas reward in the case of prediction and preparation policy is 230
s. A total reward over a period of time (that results in downtime decrease) may
be calculated as a product of the reward for a single successful prediction and a
number of successfully predicted failures in that time period (reflected in recall).
Obviously, changing recall when reward is higher will have a more significant
effect on the total reward. In other words, downtime decrease over a period
of time is more sensitive on the change of recall when reward is higher. Thus,
availability is also more sensitive on the change of recall for the case of prediction
and avoidance policy.
Higher sensitivity to the change of recall than to the change of precision is
also in line with some implementations of predictive policies (e.g. [68]) where,
based on experiments and not on a formal analysis, the authors were suggesting
that recall should be given priority over precision. However, one has to keep
in mind that precision still has to be at least as required by Equation 4.7 for a
predictive policy to improve availability with respect to the reactive one. It is
even more important to observe that improving recall has a comparable effect
on availability as changing server’s MTTF. In fact, in the case of prediction and
avoidance policy, improving recall is even more effective than improving server’s
MTTF.
Adding to this a previous conclusion, that a predictive policy makes a system
less sensitive to the change of MTTF and considering results depicted in Figure
4.8 and Figure 4.9, we may say that improving system’s availability may be more
effective by implementing a predictive policy with high prediction quality (when
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reward is also high) than by investing into high reliability components with low
failure rate. As it could be expected, one may also observe that availability is
more sensitive on recall when reward is higher. In fact, sensitivity to reward is
comparable to the one with respect to recall, whereas sensitivity with respect
to penalty is comparable to the sensitivity with respect to precision. Availabil-
ity is also very sensitive to the change of a proactive action success probability
(parameter c). One of the ways to improve this parameter is to make sure that
prediction lead time is always sufficient to perform a proactive action. Increasing
lead time will also decrease a probability that the system is already contaminated
when a failure is predicted. On the other hand, increased lead time deteriorates
the quality of prediction as observed in [67, 144]. Failure rate increase due to a
load introduced by failure prediction and other side effects, has a relatively low
effect on availability. This means that even when failure prediction introduces
significant load increase, availability may still be improved.
4.3.4 Simulation Results
The so far performed analyses assumes exponential distribution for the server
failures, which is also a frequent practice in dependability analysis considering
that models are simpler and easier to interpret when the failure rate is constant
over the lifetime. For example, sensitivity analysis of the virtualized system in
[145] has the same assumption for failure rate distributions. Nevertheless, nu-
merous papers that consider real-life systems, including a study of the 9-year
failure report of high-performance systems of the Los Alamos National Labora-
tory presented in [143], indicate that Weibull distribution is more appropriate
for modeling failure rates in computer systems. Therefore, we perform addi-
tional analysis to validate the model with Weibull distribution as well. At the
same time we also demonstrate how changing system parameters (proactive ac-
tion overhead in this case) may be decisive on whether reactive or proactive FT
is better from the availability point of view.
For the prediction and avoidance predictive policy the mitigation overhead is
set from 5 s to 530 s with discrete steps of 5 s. For the prediction and preparation
policy, checkpointing overhead is set from 5 s to 240 s. The upper limit for the
ranges is decided so that reward remains greater than zero. When the reward
is negative, reactive policy should, obviously, be used. Other parameters are as
same as in the previous analysis (see Table 4.3) and failure prediction may be de-
scribed with the PR-curve from Figure 4.1. In total, we perform more than 1000
simulations in MATLAB for the two types of predictive policies when the hazard
rate is exponential and Weibull. The shape parameter for Weibull distribution is
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set to 0.7 following the results presented in [143]. For each simulation run, pre-
diction quality is set to its optimal value that is selected following Equation 4.8,
with penalty and reward obtained as in Section 4.2.2. In each run we simulate
system’s state for the lifetime of 100*MTTF (more than 11 years). Results are
presented in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11. The horizontal line represents avail-
ability with reactive policy. Availability estimated with our model (Equation 4.3)
is presented with a dashed line.
For the prediction and avoidance policy, simulation results indicate that, for
the specific system and selected failure predictor, it is better to use reactive policy
when the overhead is over 300 s. In fact, even with a perfect failure prediction
it is still better to use reactive policy when the overhead is above 385 s. For
the prediction and preparation the breakeven checkpoint overhead value is 115
s. Most importantly, selecting between the reactive and proactive policy may be
done with the our analytical equation (model) with high confidence as minor
difference between simulated and estimated availability at the breakeven point,
for both predictive policies, may be contributed to the simulation variance. In
fact, the maximum difference in simulated and estimated availability is at the
order of 10-5 for the whole range of the overhead.
Figure 4.10. System’s availability with different virtual machine migration
overhead for prediction and avoidance policy.
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Figure 4.11. System’s availability with different checkpoint overhead for the
prediction and preparation policy.
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Chapter 5
Methodology for Online Disturbance
Prediction
An overview of the methodology for proactive management disturbances is de-
picted in Figure 5.1. We describe the main elements and identify methods for
their implementation with focus on design of disturbance prediction algorithms.
Work presented in this section has also been described in part by Kaitovic et
al. in [150].
Figure 5.1. Proactive disturbance management methodology overview.
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5.1 Monitoring and Data Acquisition
Monitoring infrastructure provides data to a prediction algorithm including smart
meter and PMU measurements. Additionally, ambient measurements (e.g. en-
vironment and wire temperature, wind speed and direction) including weather
predictions may also be a valuable input. The set of data, its quality and monitor-
ing frequency have a decisive impact on the quality of prediction. Due to a large
amount of data and still limited communication and computing resources, not
all the data may be processed at runtime. Thus, monitoring must be adaptive in
terms of monitoring frequency (sampling rate) and the number of features sent
to the predictor must be adjusted based on the current state of the grid and the
estimated probability of near-future problems. For example, if the system is in
an Alert or Emergency state (see Figure 3.1), it may be needed to acquire the
data with higher sampling rate and from additional sources (e.g. from a PMU in
a different part of the network) in order to obtain a more accurate prediction in
the light of increased probability of disturbances.
Online data that are used for prediction may also be stored to further refine
the predictor. Moreover system may be simulated in order to collect additional
data for the specific type of disturbances that rarely occur or for which there are
no live records available.
5.2 Disturbance Prediction
Disturbance prediction identifies, at runtime, whether a disturbance will occur
in the near future based on an assessment of the monitored current system state
and the analysis of past events. The output of a predictor is the type of a distur-
bance and the probability of its imminence in the near future. Depending on the
failure probability, the predefined threshold (that is set as described in Section
4.2), and available mitigation actions, the effect on availability is evaluated. The
evaluation is conducted according to Equation 4.3.
5.3 Proactive Mitigation
Once the prediction mechanisms anticipate a disturbance, corrective actions to
prevent it or to mitigate it should be scheduled and activated. A decision on
taking a proactive action has to be performed with the impact on availability in
mind. A great opportunity for the mitigation of disturbances in Smart Grid lies in
the employment of FACTS devices that provide a sub-second response, the usage
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of distributed resources and solid state transformers as well as the employment
of traditional elements such as circuit breakers and shunt capacitors that may be
particularly useful at the distribution level. Moreover, at the distribution level,
controllable DGs and solid-state transformers are considered to be the most effi-
cient methods for the grid control.
5.4 Disturbance Predictor Design
The design of a predictor should be conducted in three phases as depicted in
Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2. Disturbance predictor design phases.
5.4.1 Data Collection
In the first phase disturbance-related data are collected, preferably, from an ex-
isting system. Preliminary analysis is performed to identify the most frequent
and the most sever disturbances. As disturbances are still relatively rare events,
especially in the initial phase of a predictor design it may be necessary to simulate
system’s behavior in the presence of faults in order to obtain sufficient number
of examples for the algorithm training.
5.4.2 Data Analysis
In the second phase, the obtained dataset should be analyzed. Data conditioning
includes extraction of the features (also called events, variables or parameters by
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different research communities) and structuring the data in a form that may be
used as an input for the prediction algorithm. In particular, each data set in the
stream, that describes one system state, should be associated with a failure type
or marked as failure-free.
A preliminary feature selection should be conducted while taking into account
a system model. Feature selection is the process of selecting the most relevant
features (and instances for algorithm training) and combining them in order
to maximize predictors’ performance; discard redundant and noisy data; obtain
faster and more cost-effective algorithm training and online prediction; and to
better interpret the data relations (data simplification for better human under-
standing). Feature selection methods may be classified as filters, wrappers and
embedded methods [72]. A widely used filter method is Principal Component
Analysis (PCA). PCA converts a set of correlated features into a set of linearly
uncorrelated features (principal components) using orthogonal transformation.
The procedure is independent with respect to the type of the prediction algorithm
that will be used and thus very appropriate for preliminary selection of features.
Numerous packages are available for feature selection, including those that are
a part of popular tools for statistical analysis and machine learning (e.g. Mat-
lab/Octave, Weka, Python and R). Good overviews of feature selection methods
are given in [151] and [152].
5.4.3 Prediction Design and Evaluation
In the final stage, prediction algorithm is designed and evaluated. In fact, an
ensemble of predictors may be used to improve quality of prediction. Having in
mind a large number of existing prediction algorithms, the most viable solution is
to select and to adopt one of them. A comprehensive survey of failure prediction
algorithms is given in [72] that also groups prediction methods as those based
on: failure tracking, symptom monitoring and detected error reporting.
Failure tracking draws conclusions about upcoming failures from the occur-
rence of the previous ones. These methods either aim at predicting the time of
the next occurrence of a failure or at estimating the probability of failures co-
occurrence.
Symptoms are defined as side effects of looming faults that not necessarily
manifest themselves as errors. Symptom-monitoring based predictions analyze
the system features in order to identify those that indicate an upcoming failure.
Several methods for the estimation were proposed in the past, including function
approximation, machine-learning techniques, system models, graph models, and
time series analysis.
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Finally, the methods based on detected error reporting, such as the rule-
based, the co-concurrence-based and the pattern recognition methods, analyze
the error reports to predict if a new failure is about to happen. Current trends
in predicting disturbances in Smart Grids, such as, for example, cascading fail-
ures are mainly based on the application of machine-learning approaches, such
as neural networks, support vector machines and anomalies’ detection (see, for
example, [65]). Nevertheless it might be more appropriate to use simpler algo-
rithms for online prediction of near-future failures and disturbances to minimize
prediction latency.
After selecting and training the algorithm, evaluation should be performed
with respect to availability enhancement following Equation 4.3. A wrapper
method may be applied at this stage to refine feature selection. A typical ap-
proach would be to rank the features according to availability improvement and
to select a set of highly ranked features as the final one. In general, the goal is
to set the number of features to a minimum while, at the same time, maximizing
expected availability enhancement.
5.4.4 Tools
For the implementation of the methodology and design of a disturbance predictor
a set of different tools has been used. A brief description of these tools is given
here.
• Power System Analysis Toolbox (PSAT) [39, 153] was used to simulate
system’s behavior in the presence of faults and to generate disturbance-
related data. PSAT is a Matlab/Octave toolbox for electric power systems
simulation and analysis. Its functionalities include: power flow, continu-
ation power flow, optimal power flow, small signal stability analysis, and
time domain simulation. Its functions may be assessed through a graphi-
cal user interface and a Simulink-based library provides a user friendly tool
for network design. It also supports a number of data formats and incor-
porates a number of static and dynamic models including: bus bars, slack
buses, shunt capacitors, PV and wind generators, and voltage dependent
loads. It is an open-source tool that may be adopted and extended.
• Matlab was be used for preliminary data conditioning and preparation for
the feature selection phase. It is a high-level programing languages that
come with a rich library for data manipulation.
• For feature selection, training and evaluation of prediction algorithms, Java
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and WEKA [154] were be used. Java was mainly used for scripting and in-
voking WEKA functions and customizing the format of the output. WEKA
(Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis) is a suite for machine learn-
ing that also comes with a user-friendly GUI. It also includes a variety of
tools for transforming datasets, such as the algorithms for discretization
and sampling. The workbench has methods for the main data mining prob-
lems: regression, classification, clustering, association rule mining, and at-
tribute selection. It also provides visualization facilities and methods for
algorithms evaluation. It is fully expandable and may be used as a Java
package. Unfortunately, it may not be used directly for time series classi-
fication but the existing functions may be adopted and combined for this
purpose.
Chapter 6
Simulation and Fault Injection
Framework
Analyzing the grid and understanding its behavior, when under a disturbance,
is a prerequisite for designing methods for boosting grid’s availability. This is
the step that requires a vast amount of data to model grid’s behavior not only
when under a disturbance but also when in a fault-free state. The importance
of data for design of novel grid control methods and strategies has been also
emphasized in IBM’s vision on big data in Smart Grids [35] where smart meter
and other monitoring data are foreseen to be used for prediction of load and
renewable generation as well as for anticipation of equipment and grid failures.
In fact, methods based on data analytics and machine learning for predicting
failures of aged grid components as a support for predictive maintenance are
already being used. One such method and a relevant case study on maintaining
New York City’s electric grid has been presented in [65]. The study is based on
data on equipment status collected by a local distribution company over a long
period of time.
Unfortunately, data as the one used in [65] are rarely, if at all, available for
public use mostly due to non-disclosure issues. Moreover, digitalization of dis-
tribution grids is still an undergoing process and only a few are equipped with
devices such as PMUs that estimate measurement data with sufficient sampling
rate for thorough analysis of disturbances. Even though there are many academic
projects on Smart Grids (a comprehensive list of European Smart Grid projects
that have started before 2014 may be found in [155]), not many include pilot im-
plementations that also incorporate advanced measuring infrastructure. Those
that do as, for example, the EPFL Smart Grid [27], are still relatively small and
also well-controlled so that disturbances are very rare events. The lack of rele-
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vant data is a practical obstacle to disturbance analysis and design of methods
for their prediction.
An alternative to obtaining disturbance-related data is to employ fault in-
jection, which is a deliberate introduction of faults. Fault injection is used in
computer systems to evaluate system’s dependability and to compare different
fault-tolerant mechanisms when it is not possible to wait for or to get field data
[156]. Faults may be injected into an existing system or fault-injection approach
may be combined with system simulation. For example, in [73] a simulation
based fault-injection method to collect computer system failure data for failure
prediction assessment is presented.
We adopt a similar approach to design and implement a modular simulation
framework that allows injection of different types of faults to cause different
types of system disturbances and to recored various types of grid measurements
including voltages, currents and phasors with high sampling rate (sampling pe-
riod of down to 20ms). For example, a voltage sag may be caused by a demand
increase, by renewable generation variation, by creating a short between the
lines or by their combination. The framework also allows to classify each mea-
surement set as related with a different type of disturbance or with a normal oper-
ation state, following selected disturbance classification criteria. The framework
is designed to be flexible and modular so that simulations may be performed
at different grid levels. It is intended mainly to facilitate generation of power
system disturbance data (with focus on ADNs) that may be used for design and
assessment of detectors and predictors. It may also be used for evaluating the
relation of different types of faults, errors and failures.
A part of the work presented in this section has been produced during a su-
pervision of a master’s thesis and thus is also included in [157]. Work has also
resulted in a publication in Springer Journal on "Computer Science - Research
and Development" in March 2017 [158].
6.1 Functionalities, Structure and Components
The framework supports disturbance analysis by simulating behavior of a mod-
eled grid, for defined load and generation profiles, while dynamically injecting
faults to cause disturbances. The output data is represented in a form of time-
tagged variable vectors with each vector in one row. Each row is also classified
as related to the normal system state or to a specific disturbance according to the
selected disturbance detection (classification) criteria.
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A structural model of the framework is presented in a UML-like fashion in Fig-
ure 6.1. Rounded rectangles represent instances of input and output modules,
and rectangles represent instances of the framework engine. Solid connection
lines are used to indicate direct association between the modules in the sense
of one providing inputs to the other. Dashed lines indicate more generic depen-
dency between the modules and will be explained case-by-case. Numbers next
to association lines indicate a number of instances of one module that, in one
simulation run, may be in a relation with n instances of another module where n
stands for any positive integer (the scope of n is local in the sense that its value is
related with an association line and that, for one simulation run, this value may
be different for each association between the elements). For example, in one
simulation run one grid model is used, one or many load profiles, one or many
generation profiles, etc. but the number of generation and load profiles used is
not necessarily the same.
Figure 6.1. Structure of the simulation and fault injection framework.
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The framework is modular so that additional instances (with different im-
plementations) of the same module may be added or the existing modules may
be extended. For example, to support injection of a new type of failure, a new
instance of fault injector may be implemented and added.
6.1.1 Framework Frontend
Frontend modules include input ones that are: Grid Model, Load and Generation
Profiles, Monitored Variables Vector, Fault Set and an output module that forms
a Structured Data Set.
6.1.1.1 Grid Model
Grid Model defines the system whose behavior is to be analyzed. It may include
a large network or only its part (e.g. a distribution grid). The level of detail
should be sufficient to perform a standard power flow analysis. Grid models may
be manually created or standardized and well-accepted models may be adopted.
A list of standard IEEE test models may be found in [159] and [160].
6.1.1.2 Load and Generation Profiles
Load and Generation Profiles define variation of the load/generation of a typi-
cal consumer/generator over a period of time. The considered time period may
vary from minutes to days, depending on the goal of the analysis. Load and gen-
eration profiles depend on the type of consumer/generator and are expressed
in "per unit" (p.u.) so that the same profile may be applied to different load/-
generator capacity. The framework allows to apply different profiles to different
loads/generators so that a number of profiles may be loaded for one simulation
run. Profiles must be defined in a simple textual format and each power change
is defined as a pair of time (in seconds) and a new power value. For example, a
profile of a load that initially (from time zero) consumes 1000 W of active power
and 0 W of reactive power and increases active power consumption to 1200 W
after 10 minutes (600 seconds) of operation will look like this: "0 1000 0 600
1200 0".
6.1.1.3 Monitored Variables Vector
A set of variables may be recorded for each simulation run including voltages,
currents, active and reactive powers, and phasors. At this stage, a variable is
defined by its type and a measurement location considering a model of the grid.
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Monitored Variables Vector is used to predefine variables that will be monitored
in a simulation run.
6.1.1.4 Fault Set
Fault Set contains a list of faults that are injected in one simulation run. Each
fault must be related to a specific component of the grid (e.g. a bus, a DG, or
a relay) while considering the Grid Model and available list of faults from the
Fault Repository (that describes all types of faults that may be injected). The set
must also define the exact time for each fault injection. A number of faults may
be injected for the same component. It is important to note that injecting a fault
does not necessarily imply occurrence of a disturbance (an error or a failure) but
this also depends on system dynamics (load and generation profiles, topology of
the grid and a specific simulation scenario). For example, if a fault is injected in
a circuit breaker, but this component is not used in a specific simulation, the fault
will not be activated and no disturbance related to this fault will be observed.
6.1.1.5 Structured Data Set
Output data is presented in a way that is suitable for further analysis, with proper
classification of disturbances in CSV (comma separated value) format so that it
may be easily read by widely used data analysis tools such as Weka, MATLAB/Oc-
tave, R and Python. Variables are places in columns whereas each row represents
one data instance with a predefined sampling rate. Also, each column is tagged
with a proper classification depending on the set of disturbances that are detected
in a simulation run.
6.1.2 Framework Backend
Framework modules that take part in model simulation, dynamic manipulation,
monitoring, data recording, conditioning and manipulation are Fault Repository,
Fault Injector, Dynamic Simulator, Grid Monitor, Data Aggregator and Distur-
bance Detector.
6.1.2.1 Fault Repository
This module is a simple list that names all fault types that may be injected and for
which a proper injector is implemented. Different types of faults may be related
to the same module. For example, a short circuit or an open circuit fault may be
injected into a bus. An extensive list of faults in Smart Grid is given in taxonomy
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in Figure 2.4 and it may be used to extend the current implementation of the
Fault Repository.
6.1.2.2 Fault Injector
Fault Injector implements a mechanism to inject faults listed in Fault Repository
at runtime while taking into consideration the grid model. One fault injector
must be implemented for each fault type and a new fault injector may be added
to support a new type of fault. This module is an important part of the framework
and its implementation requires advanced knowledge of the simulation mecha-
nism as well as sufficient expertise in power systems.
6.1.2.3 Dynamic Simulator
Dynamic Simulator performs time domain simulation of the grid model and al-
lows monitoring and recording of grid parameters such as voltages, active and
reactive power, phasors and currents. It also allows to make changes in the model
at runtime so that faults may be injected.
6.1.2.4 Grid Monitor
Grid Monitor tracks and records the predefined set of parameters during the sim-
ulation following Monitored Variables Vector. It allows a user to set monitoring
sampling rate at the begging of each simulation run. This is an important fea-
ture that allows to compare disturbance analysis (prediction) results depending
on the sampling rate. It may be used, for example, to identify minimum sampling
rate required for accurate disturbance detection or prediction.
6.1.2.5 Data Aggregator
Data Aggregator assembles the data from the Grid Monitor and presents it in
one matrix. Each row of the matrix corresponds to one-time stamp and includes
values of all monitored variables.
6.1.2.6 Disturbance Detector and Classifier
Disturbance Detector and Classifier implements a mechanism for automated de-
tection of different types of disturbances by analyzing monitored and recorded
grid variables. For example, a voltage sag detector may be implemented with a
voltage threshold value so that all voltage drops under this value are considered
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as voltage sags. More complex rules may be defined for other types of distur-
bances. Detector is defined independently from the simulator and new detector
instances may be implemented and added to the framework. If a disturbance is
detected, appropriate data vector is classified accordingly. Detector labels each
data set with a code to indicate normal (disturbance-free) operation of the sys-
tem or to identify a type of detected disturbance and the associated component
(location). At least one disturbance detector (rule) must be defined for each dis-
turbance type and a number of detectors may be applied to the same data set at
once. Disturbances detection and data classification should be done after simula-
tions and generation of raw data records. In this way, different sets of structured
data may be generated from the same raw data using different detectors.
6.2 Implementation Details
Following the abstract structure of the framework presented in the previous sec-
tion, we implement a tool that we name a Dynamic Power System Fault Injector
(DyPSyFI). Implementation details are given in this section.
6.2.1 Power System Simulator
For simulation and additional functionalities such as importing and saving grid
model, we adapt PSAT that has been already introduced in Section 5.4.4 as an
open source and widely used tool mainly in academia. A part of the PSAT struc-
ture relevant to the framework implementation is given in Figure 6.2. A complete
structure and more details may be found in [39] and [153].
Most of the PSAT functions are not directly available to a DyPSyFI user but
provided through a more user-friendly GUI so that the user is not required to be
familiar with PSAT. In essence, we create a wrapper around PSAT functions and
use only their subset while providing additional functions to simplify disturbance-
related data generation process. The simulator already provides support for MAT-
LAB Simulink models that we use directly for representing grid model. In fact,
only Simulink GUI is used for representing the model whereas all the simulation
mechanisms are implemented in PSAT. PSAT is also able to convert a variety of
widely-used data formats in power systems such as IEEE common data format,
WSCC and EPRY ETMSP. We also use PSAT plotting utilities and outputs directly.
Once loaded to the framework, the model is automatically initialized by call-
ing a power flow routine from PSAT. Initialization includes setting of all the state
and algebraic system variables.
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Figure 6.2. A part of the PSAT structure.
The most relevant part of the simulator is the Time Domain Simulation that
also allows tracking and storing the selected set of parameters. We use this fea-
ture for the realization of the Grid Monitor framework module. Also, specific
points in time may be computed and stored during the time domain simulation
using a snapshot mechanism.
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6.2.2 Dynamic Model Manipulation Mechanism
Dynamic changes of model components may be imposed through a PSAT mecha-
nism that we name Dynamic Parametrization to avoid confusion due to different
terminology used in this work and in the PSAT manual [153]. This mechanism
allows to define exact value of a specified model parameter and the exact time
when this value should be set. Theoretically, all dynamic parameters of any com-
ponent may be changed which gives the possibility to simulate a wide range of
different fault-injection scenarios. For example, this may be used to dynamically
open or close a circuit breaker in the grid model or to change a generator’s output
power.
This is the exact mechanism we exploit for implementing injection on all
types of phase faults (balanced, unbalanced, cross-phase and phase-to-ground).
A breaker is placed between the lines where a fault needs to be injected, follow-
ing the settings from the Fault Set, and closed at the simulation runtime, again
following the description in the Fault Set. We use this mechanism also for imple-
menting load and generation profiles by changing generated/demanded active
and reactive power.
Fault injection may require multiple parameters to be changed at the same
time. All changes are stored in one file that is parsed at runtime. After every
change, a new power flow initialization is performed.
6.2.3 Data Generation and Conditioning
PSAT simulation output results are stored in one output file that is used by a
Data Aggregator. In general, all voltage, power, phase and current variables are
stored with a sampling rate defined by the user. Only a subset of these variables
is presented to the user depending on the selection defined in Monitored Vari-
ables Vector. Still, the user may add other variables using a data manipulation
environment. This is an important feature as data manipulation and addition of
new variable does not require another simulation run for the same simulation
setting. Disturbance Detector is implemented as a separate module independent
from PSAT. Current implementation allows detection of voltage sags and swells.
Sags are classified following the recommendations from the IEEE Recommended
Practice for Monitoring Electric Power Quality (IEEE Std 1159-2009)[161].
The output is represented in a matrix following the format given in Table
6.1. Each row contains a time stamp (in seconds), variables’ values and a distur-
bance classification code. Zero is used to represent a normal state of the system,
namely when no disturbance is detected. A disturbance code is composed of a
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disturbance type and a code of the component where the disturbance is detected.
For example, "D_VS01_B14" is used to identify a voltage sag on Bus 14.
Table 6.1. Output data format.
Time stamp [s] Var1 ... Varn Disturbance Classification
6.3 Graphical User Interface
A user-friendly GUI provides three main groups of functionalities: (i) dynamic
simulation, (ii) fault injection and (iii) manipulation of previously generated and
recorded data.
6.3.1 Simulation Environment
The snapshot of the window for parameterizing and initiating a new simulation
is presented in Figure 6.3.
Loading a model automatically performs its initialization and allows other
functions that are organized in three separate groups. Monitoring parameters
groups allows to select variables to be monitored (this also opens a separate win-
dow) as well as defining monitoring sampling rate. Sampling period is defined
as time between two consecutive measurements in seconds. Sampling rate is the
Figure 6.3. New simulation window snapshot.
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number of measurements per second. It can be set statically (to a fixed value for
the entire simulation) or dynamically by using a native PSAT algorithm. In the
latter case, the sampling rate is increased/decreased at runtime depending on
the system’s state so that simulation time is minimized.
Dynamic parameters group is used for assigning generation and load profiles
to grid components and to add faults. In the case of generation/load settings,
a separate window is used that contains a list of generators/loads on one side
and possible generation profiles on the other side. Generation and load profiles
are defined in separate .txt files that may be modified externally. Adding Faults
function opens the Fault Injection Environment window.
Simulation settings are used to define wall-clock simulation duration in sec-
onds or the maximum number of simulation iterations. Advanced settings button
opens PSAT’s simulation settings window.
6.3.2 Fault Injection Environment
A snapshot of the interface for adding faults is presented in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4. Adding faults window snapshot.
94 6.3 Graphical User Interface
Model name is displayed on the top of the window. The model may be opened
in a separate window as a visualization guide when selecting components to
inject faults into. For each component (element) of the grid a list of faults, that
may be injected, is displayed when the component is selected. Components are
grouped according to their types. A user has to select a fault and also to define
the time of fault injection in seconds (assuming that simulation starts at time
0) before adding it to the list of faults to be injected. The list of added faults
is displayed as ordered with respect to the time of fault injection. Added faults
may also be removed from the list. Closing the window automatically saves the
list of faults and brings back the simulation window in focus.
6.3.3 Data Manipulation Environment
Data manipulation environment allows basic manipulation of previously gener-
ated (and classified) data. This includes adding or removing features, changing
sampling rate and adding or removing disturbance detectors and classifiers. A
snapshot of the data manipulation window is presented in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5. Data manipulation window snapshot.
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An important feature of DyPSyFI is that it records a complete list of features
regardless of user’s selection but presents only a subset of these variables fol-
lowing user’s preferences. This allows adding new features at the later stage,
namely from the recorded data without a need of repeating a simulation of the
entire model with the same settings. Variables may also be removed as well as
the entire data rows. Maximum sampling rate is limited by the one selected be-
fore the original simulation run. Disturbance detectors may be removed or new
ones may also be added, through a separate window, and applied to the existing
data. However, due to performance issues it is strongly suggested to have only
one disturbance detector active. After manipulation, the new data set may be
saved in a separate file.
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Chapter 7
Case Study: Predicting Voltage Sags
in an Active Distribution Network
The focus in this chapter is on predicting disturbances in Active Distribution Net-
works. We choose ADNs as they are heavily affected by massive penetration
of non-dispatchable renewable generation and, at the same time, are being in-
creasingly equipped with different types of monitoring devices that include smart
meters and PMUs. Thus, on the one hand, a number of disturbances is expected
to increase even more in the near future and, on the other hand, means to detect
and to predict these disturbances are becoming available. Grid’s frequency is
regulated at the (centralized) generation and the transmission level but volatile
generation from DERs may still cause voltage fluctuations at the distribution level
[58, 162].
In fact, voltage sags are the most frequent power quality problems that cus-
tomers may observe. They may damage voltage-sensitive power equipment and
also cause substantial financial losses to distribution companies and customers
[163]. Among the most affected industries and users are manufacturing indus-
tries (e.g. semiconductor and automotive), hospitals, air traffic control, and fi-
nancial institutions. As the number of DERs increases, we may only expect more
sags and similar disturbances.
As already pointed out, pilot projects that incorporate renewable generation
and advanced monitoring equipment at the distribution level are mostly devel-
oped for well-designed and overall stable networks so that disturbances, if at all,
occur only rarely (for example, the EPFL Smart Grid1). Some, on the other hand,
do register disturbances but the monitoring infrastructure is not sufficient for
1EPFL Smart Grid, http://smartgrid.epfl.ch/
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their prediction. For example, the VEiN2 project documents a few over-voltages
(swells) caused by higher generation from DERs. The implemented monitoring
and the disturbance detection systems work with a one-minute sampling period.
Unfortunately, the data are stored with a sampling period of 15 minutes only. Our
preliminary analysis indicated that, with such sampling period, very low quality
of voltage sag prediction is obtainable (both, precision and recall below 0.1).
For that reason, we use DyPSyFI, the implemented simulation and fault-injection
framework that has been described in the previous chapter and simulate a be-
havior of a standard IEEE distribution system that has been extended to include
renewable generation.
For voltage sag prediction we adopt a set of machine-learning classification
algorithms. Classification algorithms are widely used to train models that are
then applied for classifying new elements in two or more classes. In general,
machine learning may be described as a process of getting computers to act and
to solve problems without programming them explicitly. In machine learning,
training data are used to develop a model (rule) that is then used on new data
instances. A data instance represents a vector of values of different features
(features are also called properties or attributes in different communities).
For example, in classification problems training instances are first classified
by experts. The training instances are used with a machine learning algorithm
to develop a classification model. The model is then used to classify an unknown
data instance. To obtain good accuracy of the classifier it is important that the
training set is sufficiently large and that the classes are balanced (similar number
of instances for all classes). A good example of classification is spam detection.
Different features may be used to describe an email. This may include, for exam-
ple, a number of persons to whom the email has been sent, frequency of specific
words (e.g. bank, buy, money), if a receiver is addressed by the first name or
not, and if the sender is in the receiver’s address book or not. Training instances
include emails that a user manually marks as spam or legitimate messages. Spam
detection rules are then derived from the training instances. The rules (model)
are then used to classify a new message. Clearly, the classification is not 100%
accurate. Interestingly, the accuracy usually depends more on the training data
and the selected features than on the classification algorithm [154].
2VEiN: Verteilte Einspeisung in Niederspannungsnetze, http://www.vein-grid.ch
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According to the IEEE Standard 1159-1995 [59], a voltage sag is a reduction of
a voltage rms value to below 90% of the nominal value for a duration of at least
0.5 cycle (we assume that the frequency is 50 Hz so that one cycle equals 20 ms).
Following the same standard, voltage sags may further be classified depending on
the duration of the under-voltage as instantaneous, momentary and temporary
as summarized in Table 7.1. Column "magnitude" in the table referrers to the
magnitude of the voltage reduction and not the retained voltage level whereas
"p.u." stands for "per unit." If a voltage drops below 90% of the nominal value, a
complete power interruption occurs.
Table 7.1. Classification of voltage sags and their characteristics.
Categories Duration Magnitude [p.u.]
Instantaneous Sag 0.5 - 30 cycles 0.1 - 0.9
Momentary Sag 30 cycles - 3s 0.1 - 0.9
Temporary Sag 3s - 60s 0.1 - 0.9
In this case study we focus on momentary sags but the same approach may
be used on other types of sags as well.
Adopting terminology from computer systems dependability, we use down-
time to evaluate availability. When focusing on voltage sags only, a (part of the)
system is considered as being "down" (unavailable) during a voltage sag. It is
important to observe that downtime evaluates availability from a user’s perspec-
tive as a sag may affect only a few system buses and not the entire system (e.g.
a distribution network).
Simulation of voltage sags requires advanced knowledge of the simulation
environment and a high level of power systems knowledge [164]. This process
is significantly simplified with the simulation environment that we have devel-
oped [158]. The most severe voltage sags are caused by short circuit balanced or
non-balanced faults (see Figure 2.4), as well as significant load or (distributed)
generation fluctuations, operation of circuit breakers and reclosers, and equip-
ment failures [164]. If not prevented, a voltage sag will quickly propagate to
other parts of the network. This generally depends on the grid topology, built-in
protective mechanisms, position of voltage regulators and a distance from the
fault location but also on the current state of the system (e.g. a power balance)
and system dynamics (e.g. generation and consumption fluctuation).
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We simulate a behavior of an ADN, a model of which is presented in Figure 7.1.
It is based on a standard IEEE 14-bus model [159, 160]. The model is relatively
small to perform power flow simulations and data collection rather quickly (order
of minutes per simulation) and, at the same time, large enough, so that faults
may propagate from one part of the network to the other with a delay that is
sufficient to perform prediction of voltage sags.
Figure 7.1. Active Distribution Network based on the IEEE 14-bus model.
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The model has been further extended to include two wind turbines on Buses
1 and 9, and one photovoltaic generator on Bus 2. Also, Automatic Voltage Reg-
ulators (AVRs) and synchronous compensators are included on buses where the
network connected to the rest of the grid so that voltage fluctuations that come
from the outside of the network are, partially, compensated. As summarized in
Table 7.2, the total generation power is 392 MW active and 204 Mvar reactive
power, and the total load equals 362 MW active power and 114 Mvar reactive
power. Total losses equal 30 MW active and 90 Mvar reactive power. Details on
nominal load values on individual buses are presented in Table 7.3.
Table 7.2. Overview of the network power balance.
Total generation
Active power 392 MW
Reactive power 204 Mvar
Total load
Active power 363 MW
Reactive power 114 Mvar
Total losses
Active power 29 MW
Reactive power 90 Mvar




















To cause voltage sags we have injected short-circuit faults on different buses.
Faults were injected at random time in first 15 cycles of the simulation and also
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removed at time that has been set randomly to between 1 and 15 cycles after the
fault injection. We refer to the fault-removal time as clearance time.
An example of voltage profiles on Buses 1 to 7 after a fault has been injected
on Bus 7 in cycle 7 and cleared in cycle 8, is presented in Figure 7.2. The horizon-
tal dashed line in the figure indicates a sag threshold. Sags of different duration
may be observed on Bus 1 and on Buses 4 to 7. As it may be observed, two sags
occur on Buses 4, 6, and 7. The first sag is immediately after the fault injection
whereas the second one comes with a delay of, about 10 cycles. The first sag
cannot be predicted but the second one may if proper data are observed in the
time window between the sags.
Figure 7.2. An example of voltage sags caused by a fault on Bus 7.
To simulate dynamic aspects of the system, load and renewable generation
were also varied during the simulation for up to 20% of their nominal values. We
observe that these variations heavily impact the number of voltage sags and their
propagation. In each simulation run we measure bus voltages, phase angles and
active and reactive powers. To reduce the number of features, currents are not
included as they are anyway highly correlated with voltages and powers.
During the experiments we observe that the longest time for sag propagation
through the network is obtained when faults are injected on Bus 2. For that
reason we give an overview on results when injecting faults on all the buses and
provide details for the case when faults are injected on Bus 2.
In total, we ran 100 simulations. Each simulation lasted between 20 s and
60 s. We performed 3ˆ106 measurements of voltages, active and reactive pow-
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ers and phase angles on all 14 buses. To total number of features is 56 as four
features are measured per bus and there are 14 buses in total. Simulation pa-
rameters are summarized in Table 7.4.
In each simulation run one fault is injected but zero, one or more sags may
occur on different buses depending on the topology and state of the grid.
Table 7.4. Simulation parameters summary.
Total number of simulations 100
Duration of an individual simulation in seconds from 20 to 60
Duration of an individual simulation in cycles from 1000 to 3000
Time for execution of each simulation « 1 min
Fault injection time random
Clearance time in cycles random between 1 and 15
Load demand variation 20%
Renewable generation variation 20%
Total number of features 56 (14*4)
Sampling period 20 ms (1 cycle)
Total number of measurements 3 000 000
7.3 Data Conditioning
Data output from DyPSyFI is represented as a sequence of time-tagged values
with sampling period of 20 ms (one cycle). This is also a typical sampling period
period of PMUs that are expected to be installed in most of the ADNs in the
future.
To use these data for classification algorithms’ training and evaluation, they
must be first presented in the matrix form and each data instance has to be clas-
sified. We process each data stream related to individual features separately. Sag
detection on each bus is performed simply by comparing a current voltage value
to the sag threshold (0.9 p.u.). Then, a subset of the data stream of a predefined
length L backward from the point when the sag is detected, and that includes
the entire set of measurements during the sag, is removed from the stream and
placed in a table as one data instance with the class "sag". This process is also
described in Figure 7.3 and an example of a data instance is given in Figure 7.4.
Abbreviation "p.u." stands for "per unit".
Once all the sag-related data are extracted from the stream, data related to
sag-free system state are extracted in a similar way. Subsets of consequent data of
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Figure 7.3. An example of a tagged data output sequence from DyPSyFI.
Figure 7.4. An example of a data instance.
the length L are extracted from what has been left from the original data stream
and each subset is placed in the matrix as one data instances of the class "no sag".
A simplified explanation of the idea behind the described procedure is that we
have conditioned the data in such a way that each instance represents a stream
of data that may lead to a sag (instances classified as the "sag" class) or may not
lead to a sag (instances classified as the "no sag" class). The constructed data
matrix is used for prediction model training.
We observe that none of the simulated sags have lasted more than 30 cycles.
As for improving availability we aim at using OLTCs that may be activated with
a short activation delay in a range of 10ms (less than one cycle), it is reasonable
to have relatively short lead time that is in the range of one second (50 cycles).
Following the results of predicting failures in computer systems [67], we may
expect that longer lead time will decrease prediction quality. As for that, we set
L to 100 cycles. This is sufficient to perform proactive actions and also gives a
possibility to evaluate how increasing lead time may affect the quality of predic-
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tion. Moreover, setting L to 100 is a good compromise between the length of one
data instance and the total number of instances in the specific case. Setting L
to a higher value would decrease the total number of instances to the level that
would have not been sufficient enough for training the model.
It is important to observe that in this interpretation lead time is defined with
respect to the sag classification time that occurs at the end of the sag. Namely,
lead time means how much in advance a class of the sag (that depends on its
duration) may be predicted. This is because of the structure of the data and
varying duration of sags. For this reason, only the end of the sag could be fixed
in time. However, as sags are lasting never more than 30 cycles (in fact 99%
last less than 25 cycles), this also means that a start of the sag is predicted with
sufficient lead time. For example, when sag class (end) is predicted with lead
time of 50 cycles, having in mind that it could not last more than 30 cycles,
means that start of the sag is predicted with, at least, 20 cycles lead.
We inject faults on one bus at time and perform the data conditioning proce-
dure. The procedure is performed on the data stream for every feature, detecting
sags on all the buses. For each combination of a feature and a bus where the sag
is detected, we generate a matrix that we use for training the models. For exam-
ple, for the case when faults are injected on Bus 2, the matrix has 1400 instances.
An extract of the table generated from measurements of the voltage on Bus 14
when sag detection is performed on Bus 6 is presented in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5. An example of a part of a data matrix.
To get good classification results, it is preferred that the classes are balanced.
This means that the number of instances of one class is similar to the number of
instances of the other class. A number of instances of the two classes for different
buses when a fault is injected on Bus 2 are given in Table 7.5. In this case, Bus
6 has a good balance between the "sag" and "no sag" classes (687 vs. 713). For
this reason, in the rest of the chapter, we focus on the results from predicting
sags on Bus 6 when faults are injected on Bus 2. For the comparison, we also
provide results of different states of the methodology for the sag-predictor design
on other buses as well.
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Table 7.5. Summary of the number of "sag" and "no sag" instances per bus.















For describing a predictor, besides parameters that were introduced in Sub-
section 4.1.1, namely precision, recall, and lead time, we introduce two addi-
tional parameters relevant for online prediction with time series. These are
sampling period and prediction window. Sampling period represents the time
between two consecutive measurements. Prediction window is time frame for
which the data are considered when making a prediction. For clarification, in
Figure 7.6, the case when lead time is 30 cycles and prediction window size is
50 cycles is depicted. The lightening symbol indicates time when a sag is de-
tected (and classified), whereas the bell symbol is used to mark time of the sag
prediction. For the convenience, we also indicate the time for which data are are
considered when creating one data instance with length of 100 cycles.
Figure 7.6. An example of prediction window and lead time.
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To evaluate how lead time, prediction widow size and the sampling period
may affect the quality of prediction, we generate additional data sets. From each
of 56 data matrices for individual features, we derive additional ones by having
ten different values for the lead time in the range from 0 to 90 cycles and 5
different sizes for the prediction window for each lead time value. The numbers
of different values for lead time and prediction window size are selected as a
trade-off between having sufficient number of points to depict the effect of the
parameter change on prediction quality on one side and limiting the number of
simulations and the total computation time on the other. For each combination
of the lead time and the prediction window size, we change the sampling period
in range from 20 ms to 1280 ms (in steps of (2i*20) ms for i = 0, 1,..,6). This
corresponds for a range of measuring frequency from 50 Hz down to about 0.8
Hz. In total, we generate more than 15000 data matrices for each combination
of a fault-injection and fault-prediction bus.
7.4 Prediction Quality Evaluation Method
We use the term prediction quality (prediction performance) in a sense of quan-
titative measure that assesses how well a model generalizes on an independent
data set. Typically, the entire data set is split into two sets, one for model gen-
eration (training) and the other for the model evaluation (testing). One way of
splitting the data is to use two thirds of the data set for training and one third
for evaluation. However, more accurate model verification may be obtained with
k-fold cross validation. In this approach, the entire data set is split into k subsets.
In each run, k-1 subsets are put together and are used for training, whereas the
remaining set is used for evaluation. The average of the performance evaluation
results in all the runs are then calculated and the average value is reported as
the final result. Observe, that in each run, the remaining kth set that is used for
the evaluation, has not been used for the model training in that run and, for the
model trained in the run represents a fully new data set. In practice, when the
number of data instances in sufficiently high (typically more than 1000), 10-fold
set validation is the most frequently used. More details may be found in [165].
For quality evaluation, at this stage, for practical reasons we use F-measure,
precision and recall. Namely, we use algorithms developed as a part of the Weka
tool that incorporate optimization with respect to F-measure, precision and re-
call. The F-measure will be used only for feature selection and preliminary algo-
rithm evaluation whereas the final selection of the precision-recall pair will be
performed with A-measure.
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As features are collected via simulation, they are limited to phase angle, active
and reactive power, frequency, voltage and current on each bus. These features
are also most widely used to describe power systems. More importantly, it is most
likely that the same set of features is stored in data logs that may be used to train
predictors. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that other features may also
be collected in a real system and they might be more indicative for prediction
of sags or other disturbances. These include the rate of change of frequency as
well as raw waveforms sampled with a PMU. Moreover, additional features may
be derived as, for example, difference between two consecutive raw waveform
samples or peaks of voltage samples.
As frequency is regulated at the transmission level and does not depend on
events in the distribution grid, it has been excluded from the list of features.
Current values were also not considered, as current may be derived from voltage
and power. Preliminary feature selection is further performed for each of the
selected algorithms separately. For this purpose, we took five most commonly
known and widely used machine-learning classification algorithms.
A brief description of the selected algorithms is given in Table 7.6. Time com-
plexity for training the algorithms using Big O notation is included in the same
table (m stands for the number of instances and n for the number of features).
Versions of the algorithms that are implemented in Weka version 3.8 have been
considered when estimating complexity. More details on these and other algo-
rithms may be found in [154].
The use of filtering methods for the preliminary selection was not practical
as features are placed in separate tables, and finding correlation between indi-
vidual features would require more effort (and no better results) than using a
wrapper method for each algorithm. Also, it is important to observe that, from
the algorithm’s point of view, there are more than 56 features (14 buses with 4
features per bus). In this view, a feature is a combination of a system parameter
(voltage, phase angle, etc.) and a time before the event.
Performance of each algorithm is evaluated with F-measure using ten-fold
cross validation on every combination of lead time, prediction window size and
sampling period for each of 56 features. Then, an average F-measure for every
combination is set as a feature rank.
As an example, feature ranks when logistic regression algorithm is used for
predicting sags on Bus 6 for the case when a fault occurs on Bus 2, are given
in Table 7.7. It should be noted that a feature is uniquely identified with a bus
number (1 to 14) and a feature type (V, P, S, T).
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Uses Bayes’ theorem to calculate a
probability that an instance belongs to
a class, assuming that features are
fully independent. A threshold




Creates a function where weights are
associated with features. The function
is used to calculate a probability that
an instance belongs to a class. A
threshold (typically 0.5) is applied to
make the classification decision.
O(mn2) [167]
SVM
(Support Vector Machine) Creates an
optimal hyperplane in the feature
space to split between two classes.
See [168] for more details.
O(m3) [169])
IBk (k-NN)
Uses k nearest neighbors in the feature
space to classify a new instance. O(mn) [170]
J48 (C4.5)
Creates a decision tree using
information entropy. See [171] for
more details.
O(mn2) [172]
Following the ranking procedure, ten most indicative features for every algo-
rithm are identified. In Tables 7.8a and 7.8b we present results for the case of
sag detection on Bus 6 when faults are injected on all other buses. The case of
injecting a fault and predicting a sag on the same bus has not been considered
as, in this case, a fault has an immediate affect and no prediction is possible.
Features are represented by a feature type symbol as in Table 7.7 (V - Voltage, P -
Active power, S - Reactive power, and T - Phase angle) followed by the bus num-
ber. They are ranked with integers from one to ten, with one being the highest
rank.
It may be observed that features that are closer to the fault-injection bus have
higher rank. In fact, following the results presented in the two tables, we may
derive more specific rules:
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Table 7.7. Feature ranking with F-measure for Logistic regression for the case
of sag prediction on Bus 6 when faults are injected on Bus 2.
Bus Voltage (V) Active power (P) Reactive power (S) Phase angle (T)
1 0.636 0.819 0.736 0.808
2 0.663 0.702 0.826 0.824
3 0.675 0.787 0.690 0.808
4 0.683 0.799 0.800 0.784
5 0.700 0.803 0.803 0.798
6 0.724 0.725 0.757 0.800
7 0.702 0.518 0.517 0.791
8 0.656 0.626 0.730 0.790
9 0.715 0.806 0.806 0.793
10 0.727 0.806 0.806 0.795
11 0.738 0.807 0.807 0.798
12 0.741 0.806 0.806 0.800
13 0.753 0.806 0.806 0.801
14 0.740 0.805 0.805 0.797
• Phase angle, active and reactive power values on the bus where the fault
is injected are typically among four most indicative features;
• Phase angles on buses with large loads that are connected or close to the
fault-injection bus, in most of the cases, among the five most indicative
features;
• Active powers and phase angles of the buses with renewable generators
(windmills in particular) are among the most indicative features if the bus
is electrically close to the one where a fault has been injected;
• Active and reactive power values, as well as phase angles of buses that are
electrically close to the bus where a sag is being predicted are among ten
most indicative features.
In addition, we may observe that for IBk and J48 algorithms the most indica-
tive features mostly include phase angles.
Also, it is worth pointing out that, when the objective is to create a general
sag predictor on a selected bus that does not take into account position of the
fault, then, active, reactive power values, and phase angles of the buses that
are electrically close to the bus where a sag is being predicted should be used.
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However, the prediction performance in this case will not be the maximum one
as these features typically have rank above six.
Table 7.8a. The most indicative features for different machine-learning algo-
rithms when sags are predicted on Bus 6 for fault injected on Buses 1 to 7.
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Table 7.8b. The most indicative features for different machine-learning algo-
rithms when sags are predicted on Bus 6 for fault injected on Buses 8 to 14.
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To identify the most appropriate algorithm as well as the number of the most
indicative features whose combination gives the best prediction performance in
a combination with the algorithm, we evaluate performance of each of the five
algorithms from Table 7.6 for combinations of the most indicative features identi-
fied in Tables 7.8a and 7.8b. We focus on the case when faults are injected on Bus
2 and sags predicted on Bus 6 as, according to the values of F-measures for indi-
vidual highly-ranked features (presented in Table 7.7), prediction performance
with individual features is the highest for this case (when compared to other com-
binations of fault-injection and sag-prediction buses). Thus, we may also expect
the best performance with combinations of the most indicative features that will
serve well for demonstrating to what extent availability may be improved with
proactive approach. However, it is also important to point out that prediction
performance with the most highly-ranked individual features for other combina-
tions of fault-injection and sag-prediction buses is, in the worst case, lower than
for the selected fault-injection and sag-prediction bus combination, at the order
of 10-2. Therefore, we may expect that combinations of the most indicative fea-
tures for different fault-injection and sag-prediction buses may under-perform,
with respect to the selected case, in the same order of magnitude.
For each algorithm the features are combined by starting with the single most
indicative feature and adding, one by one, the next one from the list. Hence, a
combination of n features is, in fact, a combination of n most indicative ones.
This is also a standard practice in feature ranking and the most common heuris-
tic [151]. Prediction performance is evaluated with average F-measure for all
variations of lead time, prediction window and sampling period. Results are
presented in Figure 7.7.
Intuitively, we may expect that performance increases with higher number
of features. However, in most of the cases, significant improvement may be ob-
served only while the number of features is low. Specifically, in the case of IBk al-
gorithm (that also shows the best overall performance), prediction performance
increases until the number of features reaches four. After this number of fea-
tures, the performance starts to decrease. The decrease may be contributed to
a combination of feature correlation and overfitting. Overfitting (also known as
high variance) occurs when a model includes too many features so that it almost
perfectly describes training data set and fails to generalize [173]. In other words,
instead of capturing the main phenomena that drives behavior of the system, the
model also captures noise. This is, to some extent, not possible to avoid but too
much noise may overshadow the main behavior of the system. Also, with more
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Figure 7.7. Evaluation of performance of different algorithms for combinations
of the most indicative features.
features, there is a higher chance of their correlation. With high correlation,
too much importance may be given to a certain property of the system. In an
extreme case, when two features are fully correlated, adding them both to the
model would be the same as adding one feature twice and thus misleading the
model. For example, power is a product of voltage and current. If two out of
these three features are already included in the model, adding the third one may
only decrease the model’s performance. The same goes to active power, reactive
power and the phase angle on the same bus as these features are also correlated.
It is interesting to observe how performance when Naïve Bayes algorithm is
used, starts to decrease already after the second feature has been added. This
is because the algorithm assumes that features are not correlated and thus it is
very sensitive to correlation.
With the exception of the case with Logistic regression, when performance
reaches a steady level after the ninth feature has been added, and the case with
Naïve Bayes that has already been discussed, we may observe that the perfor-
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mance with other three algorithms reaches a steady level with four up to six
features. Obtaining good results with only a few features is also in line with
[67] where the best performance of predicting failures in computer systems is
obtained when only two features are used. The observation has to be analyzed
in the light of the conclusions on the most indicative features listed at the end of
the previous subsection. We may conclude that the best prediction performance
may be obtained when combining features that are phase angles, active and reac-
tive powers on the bus where the fault occurs and the buses that feed large loads
or to which renewable generators are connected (and that are also electrically
close to the fault-occurrence bus).
The case when IBk (k-nearest neighbors) algorithm is used, is obviously the
most interesting one as it outperforms all the other cases. The best performance
(F-measure of 0.938) is obtained when only four most indicative features are
used. These are phase angle and active power on the fault-injection bus, and
phase angles on two buses connected to it that have a large load and a renewable
generator.
Clearly, we cannot derive a general conclusion based on a case of a relatively
small grid but, following our results, it would make sense to, for a case of another
grid, first look at results with IBk with phase angles on the fault-injection and
neighboring buses.
7.7 Analyzing the Effect of Prediction Parameters on
Its Quality
For the case of IBk algorithm with four features, we first analyze how the size
of a prediction window affects prediction performance. For each lead time, we
quantify the performance for five different prediction window sizes. The values
are set in a range from zero (excluded) to the maximum prediction window size
(included) so that the difference between two consecutive values is constant.
As each data instance has a "length" of 100 cycles there is no fixed value for the
maximum prediction window size but it varies with the lead time so that the sum
of lead time and prediction window size is 100 cycles. For example, when lead
time is 50 cycles, the maximum prediction window size is also 50 cycles. In this
case the prediction window size takes values of 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 cycles.
In Figures 7.8a, 7.8b and 7.8c we depict how, for lead time of 10, 30 and 90
cycles, the size of the prediction window affects prediction performance.
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Figure 7.8a. The effect of prediction window size on prediction performance
when lead time is 10 cycles.
Figure 7.8b. The effect of prediction window size on prediction performance
when lead time is 30 cycles.
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Figure 7.8c. The effect of prediction window size on prediction performance
when lead time is 90 cycles.
Also, we have analyzed other cases for lead time and observed similar trends
as in the ones presented in the figures. We repeat here that due to the data
structure, lead time is defined with respect to sag classification (the end of the
sag). Having in mind that sags last up to 30 cycles, prediction with lead time 50
cycles means that prediction is at least with 20 cycles lead time with respect to
the sag start.
It may be observed that a performance of the predictor decreases with a de-
crease of size of the prediction window as less data are provided to the predictor.
However, this may not always be the case as, especially for some algorithms,
more data may cause overfitting and larger prediction window may decrease al-
gorithm’s performance. Following the analysis, when optimizing prediction per-
formance, one should first consider the maximum prediction window but also
evaluate performance as prediction window decreases in the range of about 20%.
With this respect, it is also interesting to observe how performance of a sag
detector (that may be considered as a predictor with lead time zero) is affected
by the prediction window size. We depict this case in Figure 7.8d.
Unlike in the previous cases, the performance decreases with increasing win-
dow size. For efficient detection, only data at the time of sag are sufficient.
Adding any data before the sag introduces noise and thus decreases performance.
We further evaluate how lead time affects prediction performance. For all the
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Figure 7.8d. The effect of prediction window size on sag detection performance.
lead time values, we set the prediction window size to 30 cycles and the sampling
period to the maximum (20 ms). Having a fixed value for the prediction window
size is important for the comparison as, having in mind the generated data set,
the maximum prediction window size value would mean that different ones are
used for different lead times. Specifically, as the size of an instance is 100 cycles,
this means that the maximum size for prediction window when lead time is 10
cycles is 90 cycles, when lead time is 80 cycles maximum prediction window is
20 cycles and so on. To have a valid comparison, we fix the prediction window
size rather than using the maximum value (that, in general may give the best
performance for individual values of lead times). As indicated in Figure 7.9,
performance drops as lead time increases.
A lesson that may be learned from this result is that increasing lead time
comes with a relatively significant performance decrease. In particular, the dif-
ference between the highest and the lowest F-measure obtained is 0.03 (0.955
for lead time of 10 cycles and 0.922 for lead time of 70 cycles). For these two
F-measure values and the specific case, precision and recall are 0.931 and 0.981
when F-measure is 0.955, and 0.895 and 0.951 when F-measure is 0.922. In
practice this means that with lead time of 10 cycles (0.2 s) out of 1000 sags 981
will be predicted, whereas only 19 will be missed. The total number of alarms in
this case equals 1054. This is a quotient of true-positive alarms (981) and pre-
cision (0.931). Thus, the predictor will raise additional 73 false alarms in this
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Figure 7.9. The effect of lead time on prediction performance.
case. When lead time is 70 cycles (1.4 s) out of 1000 sags, 951 will be predicted
and 49 will be missed. The total number of alarms in this case is 1063 meaning
that even 112 false alarms will be raised. This means 30 fewer predicted sags
and 39 more false predictions. Depending on the application of the predictor
and the selected countermeasures, this may have higher or lower impact on sys-
tem properties such as availability or the total cost of ownership. The effect on
availability will be addressed later in this chapter.
Lastly, we analyze the effect of the sampling period on prediction quality. The
evaluation is performed for different lead times (presented with different lines)
and, for each lead time the maximum size of the prediction window is taken.
Results are presented in Figure 7.10.
A general trend is that performance decreases with increasing sampling pe-
riod. However, a few exceptions from this trend occur. On average, the best
performance is obtained not when the sampling frequency is maximum (period
of 20ms) but for the next sampling period value (40 ms). As in the previous
cases this may be explained with overfitting. Namely, higher sampling frequency
means that more data are taken into consideration and these data are also cor-
related in time. With decreasing sampling frequency (increasing the period) this
correlation in time is decreased as some data are not taken into consideration.
Similarly, performance improvement as lead time increases to 30 cycles may
be explained with overfitting. Namely, we have to keep in mind that, in this case,
prediction window also changes with lead time so that it equals 90 when lead
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Figure 7.10. The effect of sampling period on performance of prediction with
different lead times.
time is 10, 80 when lead time is 20, and 70 when lead time is 30 cycles. Again,
more data may introduce more correlation and noise that decrease performances.
In general, having in mind that machine learning algorithms are based on
statistics, we may also not expect fully deterministic results. Thus, our conclu-
sions may be considered as generic only to a limited extent and variations and
exceptions may occur. Hence, just as in the case of the sampling period, when the
goal is to maximize performance, one should first evaluate it with the minimum
sampling period (maximum frequency) but also consider the cases when period
is multiplied by two and four.
Finally, at the end of this section, we have to repeat that the impact of predic-
tion, sensitivity on prediction performance and the importance of performance
measures such as precision and recall (that reflect the number of true-positive,
false-positive and false-negative alarms) depend on the application.
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7.8 Analyzing the Effect on Availability
We analyze to what extent, with respect to a purely reactive approach to voltage
sag mitigation, availability may be enhanced if sags are predicted and preven-
tively mitigated. In both cases we use an Online Tap Changer (OLTC) for voltage
control as, besides shunt capacitors, they are the most common means used in
distribution systems for this purpose [14, 58]. In addition, OLTCs are good for
our case study as it is relatively easy to understand how penalty and reward,
that are introduced in Chapter 4, Subsection 4.1.1, may be calculated to estimate
downtime decrease and availability enhancement with a proactive approach.
An OLTC is a mechanism that allows to change a transformer’s ratio, while
the transformer is carrying a load (while it conducts current) without a need to
interrupt electric power delivery. This is used for online voltage control by react-
ing on detected or anticipated voltage changes (sags or swells). Depending on
the direction, changing the tap increases or decreases voltage on the secondary
side of the transformer.
The basic principle of an OLTC operation is presented in Figure 7.11 that has
been adapted from [58]. Annotations ’P’ and ’S’ are used to indicate primary and
secondary sides of the transformer. A voltage level on the secondary side (US)
is being constantly monitored and the rms value is compared to the nominal
voltage level (USET). If the difference is higher than the maximum tolerable one
(UDB), a tap changer is triggered. The tap change direction depends on if the
US is higher or lower than the USET. As OLTCs are still expensive devices, with a
limited number of tap changes during lifetime, it is not economically justifiable
to react on every voltage sag or swell. As for that, the tap is changed only when
a sag lasts sufficiently long as, typically, longer sags are more severe. For that
reason a time delay (tdelay) is introduced to postpone the tap change with respect
to the voltage deviation detection. The exact value of the delay depends on
the network structure, distribution of voltage deviations and availability of other
voltage control means (e.g. shunt capacitors). For large grids it may be up to a
few seconds or even minutes. More details on how to set the time delay may be
found in [174].
For the 14-bus network, for which we have developed a predictor, we caused
only momentary voltage sags that last up to 30 cycles (0.6s). In Figure 7.12 we
show a distribution of the number of sags with respect to their duration.
These sags may be mitigated with an OLTC. We set the OLTC delay to 10
cycles, so that only sags that last more than 10 cycles are mitigated. To simplify,
we assume that one tap change is sufficient for voltage control and that, after
the initial tap change when the voltage drops below 90% of the nominal value,
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Figure 7.11. Basic principle of an OLTC operation.
Figure 7.12. Distribution of the number of sags with respect to their duration.
no changes are needed if the voltage drops further. Following the introduced
nomenclature, the OLTC is set as follows: USET = 1 p.u., UDB = 0.1 p.u., and tdelay
= 10 cycles.
With the selected setting and a purely reactive approach, a transformer’s tap
is changed if a voltage drop below 0.9 p.u. is detected and if it lasts for at least
10 cycles. We assume that sags are detected with no delay. This is a realistic
assumption as with advanced monitoring equipment, such as a PMU, voltage
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fluctuations may be detected almost instantaneously (sampling period of a PMU
is typically 20ms). Also, we may assume that a reaction of an OLTC is instan-
taneous as well. These assumptions may make the estimation of downtime and
availability with individual strategies somewhat less accurate but the comparison
between the approaches should not be affected significantly. For the particular
case, provided the distribution from Figure 7.12, a delay time of 10 cycles means
that 410 out of 713 sags are mitigated, whereas 303 are ignored. In total, the
unmitigated sags cause a downtime of 993 cycles (19.83 s). As in a reactive
approach the tap is changed with a delay of 10 cycles, users still experience a
downtime during the first 10 cycles of a sag even for those sags that are miti-
gated. This brings additional 4100 cycles (82 s) of downtime. Thus, the total
downtime with a reactive approach equals 5093 cycles or 101.86 s.
In a proactive approach, we first anticipate, before the start of a sag, if the
sag will last for more than 10 cycles or not. If the prediction is that the sag’s
duration is more than 10 cycles, an OLTC is immediately triggered upon the sag’s
detection to avoid additional downtime that is introduced with a delayed tap
change. The proactive approach that we propose relies on both, sag prediction
and sag detection, and as such may be also considered as a proactive-reactive
approach.
For this purpose we first design a predictor that predicts only sags that last
more than 10 cycles. Following the previous analysis, we use IBk algorithm
and set the lead time to 40 cycles to have sufficient time for proactive reaction.
The prediction window size is set to 60 cycles and sampling period is 40 ms. A
precision-recall curve of the developed algorithm is presented in Figure 7.13.
A selection of the optimal point on the curve is performed using the A-measure
(Equation 4.8 from Chapter 4, Subsection 4.1.1) and following the procedure
from 4.2.2. For the convenience, we repeat the equation here as 7.1 . We also
remind the reader that a corresponds to the failure rate increase factor due to
prediction, whereas c is a proactive action success probability. Unlike in com-
puter systems where a prediction may interfere with the execution of the main
process and increase the failure rate, prediction itself cannot affect the voltage
level and the number of voltage sags (at least not in the analyzed case). Thus,
a equals zero. Also, as a proactive action (tap change) is triggered with the sag
detection, just like in the reactive case, when comparing reactive and proactive
approach we may assume that the success probability equals one as the same
action is used in both approaches.
Ameasure “ R ˚
´
reward ˚ c´ `p1´ cq ` 1´ P
P
˘ ˚ penal t y¯ (7.1)
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Figure 7.13. A precision-recall curve of the predictor of sags that last more
than 10 cycles.
Reward is a downtime decrease in the case of a correct prediction and a suc-
cessful proactive action. This corresponds to the OLTC time delay that, in our
case, is 10 cycles. Finally, penalty corresponds to introduced downtime when
the action was needless or unsuccessful. Again, as actions are triggered only
upon a detection, there cannot be a case where a tap is changed only because
of a sag prediction and where a sag has not been detected, and thus the penalty
equals zero. It is important to point out that it may still happen that a sag that
lasts less than the OLTC delay time is predicted as a longer sag and that the tap
is, unnecessary, changed when such a sag is detected. This case will not intro-
duce additional downtime (in fact it will even contribute to the total downtime
decrease) but it is not favorable from the economical point of view as the OLTC
should be triggered only for longer sags. However, the effect of prediction on the
operational cost is considered to be out of the scope of this work.
As penalty is zero, the procedure for finding an optimal PR point is simplified
as only recall has to be maximized. The maximum recall value for the designed
predictor equals 0.996, whereas precision for this point equals 0.673. Under
the assumptions stated before for the case of the reactive approach, the total
downtime with the selected point equals 994.64 cycles (19.89 s). Sags that last
more than 10 cycles, and that are mitigated, contribute with only 16.4 cycles of
downtime (0.33 s).
Estimating the effect on availability first requires to estimate MTTF and MTTR
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of voltage sags. According to industrial reports, such as [175] and statistical
analysis as [176], a typical number of voltage sags in distribution networks is
from about 20 to 50 per year. However, provided the challenges that come with
renewable generation and load increase, we may only expect this number to
increase in ADNs. As for that, we evaluate availability for the range of 20 to
500 sags per year. This corresponds to a range of MTTF from 18.25 days to 17.5
hours.
Following the results of our simulation, and assumed OLTC delay of 10 cy-
cles, MTTR for the reactive case equals 7.14 cycles (0.143 s), whereas MTTR for
the proactive case is 1.39 cycles (0.028 s). Availability with reactive and with
proactive policy for different number of sags per year and different OLTC delay
time is presented in Figure 7.14.
Figure 7.14. Availability for OLTC delay of 10 cycles and different number of
sags per year.
The extent to what availability is enhanced strongly depends on the number
of sags per year. When the number of sags per year is 50, availability with both
approaches is very high. With the reactive approach it is 0.99999977 and with
the proactive one it is 0.99999995. This corresponds to annual downtime of only
about 300 ms in the reactive and 60ms in the proactive case. However, as the
number of sags increases, their affect as well as the difference between the two
strategies, become more evident. When this number reaches 500, availability
improvement is almost by the order of magnitude, namely from about five and
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a half nines in the reactive, to six and a half nines in the proactive case. This
corresponds to downtime of 3 s in the case of the reactive and 0.6 s in the case
of the proactive approach.
However, we must keep in mind that the analyzed network is relatively small
and that the sags that we were able to simulate in such network are relatively
short. In a larger network where faults are more frequent and may affect larger
number of customers the benefit of a proactive approach will be even higher.
We also analyze how availability changes in a larger network where the OLTC
delay time is also longer and goes up to 100000 cycles (3.33 min). This corre-
sponds to cases of also longer momentary and temporary sags. We assume that
the distribution is similar to the one from Figure 7.12 in a sense of the number
of sags that last less than the delay time and those that last more is similar to the
case that we have simulated. The results are presented in Figure 7.15. Numbers
in brackets in the figure legend indicate the size of the delay time in cycles of 20
ms (10 cycles is 0.2 s and 10.000 cycles is 200 s or about 3.3 min).
When the OLTC delay is set to 1000 cycles (20 s) and the number of sags per
year is 50 (that is already a realistic scenario in today’s distribution grids that do
not incorporate renewable generation), availability with the reactive approach is
0.99997727, whereas availability with the proactive one is 0.99999544. Again,
the improvement is almost by the order of magnitude (from four and a half to
five and a half nines). This corresponds to a downtime per year of almost 30 s
with the reactive and almost 6 s with the proactive approach.
This difference is even higher when the number of sags per year and OLTC
delay increase. In Table 7.9 we compare availability and downtime per year for
the selected points from Figure 7.15.
It may be observed that, regardless of the number of sags and the OLTC delay,
proactive approach always improves availability by, approximately, an order of
magnitude when compared to the reactive one.
127 7.8 Analyzing the Effect on Availability
Figure 7.15. Availability for a range of values for the OLTC delay and a different
number of sags per year.
Table 7.9. Availability and downtime per year for the selected values of the















50 2 0.9999977 0.9999995 2.99 0.60
50 20 0.9999773 0.9999954 29.86 6.00
50 200 0.9997728 0.9999544 298.55 59.98
500 2 0.9999773 0.9999954 29.86 6.00
500 20 0.9997728 0.9999544 298.55 59.98
500 200 0.9977325 0.9995437 2979.44 599.54
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Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks, Main
Contributions and Future Work
With the evolution towards Smart Grids, the power system and distribution grids
in particular, are facing numerous challenges. These include increasing power
demand, rising penetration of intermittent renewable energy resources, struc-
tural changes and growing complexity of the grid, new types and higher fre-
quency of faults and disturbances, as well as a demand for more flexible and
even more efficient grid management. In the light of these challenges, foster-
ing dependability of the electric power delivery service has become ever-more
difficult. This requires novel control and management approaches to attain the
current level and to further enhance dependability of the power system as a crit-
ical infrastructure. In this dissertation, a proactive control approach, based on
short-term prediction of disturbances and their mitigation, for improved avail-
ability of Smart Grids has been proposed. The main focus of the work is on
prediction of disturbances in Active Distribution Networks.
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
Smart Grid dependability has been comprehensively analyzed by taking an inte-
grated approach to address dependability of a Smart Grid as a whole, considering
its cyber and physical infrastructures as well as their interdependencies. Gener-
ally, different approaches to dependability in electric power and computer sys-
tems communities pose a danger of compromising dependability of Smart Grids.
For that reason, dependability definitions, as used in the two communities, have
been reviewed and compared. As a result, a unique set of Smart Grid depend-
ability attributes have been identified and their definitions and figures of merit
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have been proposed. A large set of major blackouts has been analyzed to identify
the most common root causes of power system disturbances and to conduct their
classification in a form of a developed taxonomy of Smart Grid faults. The pro-
posed set of definitions and the taxonomy contribute to better communication
between the two communities and give a unique view on the Smart Grid de-
pendability. In that way, they also help in identifying future research directions
in dependability and security of Smart Grids. Moreover, the taxonomy helps to
better understand the overall dependability of Smart Grids as it identifies ma-
jor threats that may compromise it. This is particularly important in the light of
ongoing grid’s digitalization as some of the threats that we have identified and
classified, or their combinations, may become more frequent in the near future
as the grid evolves. Being aware of these threats is a first step towards develop-
ing methods, such as proactive ones, for their prevention and mitigation before
they compromise grid’s dependability.
To better understand how proactive management affects availability and what
the required criteria for the quality of prediction are, a model of proactive (pre-
dictive) disturbance management has been developed. The model is generic and
it may be applied in different fields and for modeling the effect of the proac-
tive approach on different system properties but availability remains our main
focus. Using the model, availability of a system with a proactive approach may
be quantified and then compared to the one with a reactive approach to answer
the fundamental question whether to manage a system reactively or proactively.
To accomplish this we have extended the availability equation with parameters
that characterize reactive and proactive management approaches. A proactive
approach is modeled with precision and recall, penalty and reward, proactive
action success probability and potential failure rate increase due to the predic-
tion load. The model and the equation are intuitive, and easy to understand and
apply. From the equation we have derived A-measure that may be used to find the
optimal trade-off between the precision and recall. As data on disturbances and
availability in power systems are still limited, the model has been evaluated on
a case from computer systems, namely a virtualized server system. We conclude
that, for realistic system parameters, availability may be improved when failure
prediction quality is sufficiently high. The break-even point, when availability
of the system is the same as with or without predictions, depends on precision
only but the total improvement of availability is strongly affected by recall. In
fact, we conclude that the sensitivity of a system’s availability with respect to re-
call is comparable to the one with respect to mean-time-to-failure. Therefore, it
may be more cost-effective to invest in high-quality prediction algorithm than in
acquiring costly components with lower failure rates to increase availability. We
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also provide guidelines for applying the method to other types of systems. Us-
ing our approach developers and system designers may evaluate the benefits of
using a proactive management before investing in its implementation. We focus
on availability but the approach may also be extended to evaluate the affect of
prediction on other system properties including the total cost of ownership.
A methodology and methods for proactive control in Smart Grid, in a sense
of proactive management of disturbances for improved availability is then pro-
posed. They are based on data analytics and inspired by well-established solu-
tions employed in computer engineering. The concept relies on statistical analy-
sis of historic pre-event data coupled with online monitoring of the most indica-
tive features for prediction of near-future disturbances and their mitigation. The
approach may also be applied to address different types of disturbances or unde-
sirable changes, or to enhance other dependability properties apart from avail-
ability. The methodology and methods for the design of a disturbance predictor
are described in detail. Moreover, the proposed methodology is fully modular
and the implementation of the modules is not limited to the proposed methods.
When evaluating how a specific combination of prediction quality and mitigation
method affects availability, the previously described availability equation and the
A-measure may be used.
The main obstacle to the design of a disturbance predictor and application
of a proactive control approach is a lack of relevant disturbance-related data. To
overcome this obstacle, a framework for synthetizing power systems disturbance-
related data based on simulation and fault injection has been developed. The
framework performs simulations using PSAT power systems simulator. We have
developed a mechanism and provided an interface to inject and to clear faults
at predefined times. To reflect dynamic aspects of a system, we have also imple-
mented a mechanism to vary generation and load at runtime. Finally, we have
implemented a mechanism for detection of voltage sags. Being an extension of
an existing tool, the framework supports a wide set of model formats. Most im-
portantly, it allows to record a set of selected system features with a predefined
sampling rate. Thus, it may be used to simulate behavior of a system in presence
of faults that may cause disturbance and to log the data that also include infor-
mation on observed disturbances. This capability clearly contributes to Smart
Grid dependability enhancement by providing an instrument to facilitate investi-
gation of disturbances. We use the framework to synthesize disturbance-related
data for design and evaluation of a sags predictor but it may also be employed
when designing a new generation of disturbance detectors and evaluating sen-
sitivity on generation and load variations as well as monitoring sampling rate.
It may be further enhanced to support the analysis of grid’s robustness to varia-
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tions in (distributed) generation and its capability to accept additional renewable
generators. Finally, it may be used to evaluate how effective different protection
mechanisms and management methods are with respect to different types of
faults that we have classified in the scope of our taxonomy of Smart Grid faults.
As a part of the case study, following the proposed methodology, we have
implemented a predictor for voltage sags in an Active Distribution Network. To
illustrate our methodology, voltage sags have been selected as they are marked
as one of the most frequent and severe disturbances in distribution networks. We
have simulated a behavior of a 14-bus ADN in the presence of balanced short-
circuit faults and varying load and generation that cause voltage sags. Machine
learning classification algorithms are applied when designing a predictor. The
quality of prediction is evaluated with F-measure as well as with precision and
recall using ten-fold cross validation. We have also evaluated how lead time,
sampling period and prediction window size affect prediction quality. We con-
clude that, in the simulated grid, momentary voltage sags that last up to 0.6 s
may be predicted up to 1.8 s in advance with a very good quality of prediction
(precision of 0.909, and recall of 0.968). As a part of predictor design, prediction
accuracy with individual features and their combinations have been evaluated.
We observe that the best prediction quality may be obtained when combining
four most indicative features, and that phase angle and active power values on
the bus where the fault is injected are the most indicative for sag prediction. Even
though this may have been expected by the domain experts, it is an important
conclusion as it helps to decrease the amount of data that need to be monitored,
collected and propagated in realtime. Moreover, we conclude that the best re-
sults are obtained with the k-nearest neighbors machine-learning algorithm with
a combination of phase angles on the fault-injection (fault-occurrence) bus and
the buses that are connected to it and that host large loads of renewable gen-
eration. We also observe that longer lead time and shorter prediction window
typically decrease predictor’s performance and that sampling rate has a strong
impact on the quality of prediction, especially when the lead time is long. Even
though it is difficult to provide general conclusions based on a relatively small
grid that has been modeled and that it is unrealistic to expect deterministic re-
sults when statistical methods, such as machine learning, are used we may still
derive general guidelines. First, a disturbance predictor design depends on the
fault location and it may not be practical to invest into a design of a generic
predictor that does not take into account a type and a location of a fault that
causes the disturbance. Also, such a predictor would not be very useful as it
may also require to perform fault localization before its mitigation. Second, pre-
diction performance may be affected by ovefitting and feature correlation. For
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that reason it is not always the case that shorter lead time, large prediction win-
dow and higher sampling rate will improve prediction performance as this also
increases the amount of data. Thus, designers should also evaluate prediction
performance when these parameters vary, in the limited scope, from their val-
ues that would be expected to maximize performance (e.g. consider decreasing
sampling rate by 20% from the maximum). Third, in practical applications it
would make sense to develop a predictor considering parts of the grid that have
had the most frequent failures in the past. Finally, using the developed model
of proactive control and A-measure, we have optimized prediction and evalu-
ated how it affects availability. For this purpose we have modeled sag mitigation
with an OLTC. In our conclusion, with prediction quality as the one that we were
able to obtain and with proactive mitigation of voltage sags, availability may be
improved approximately by an order of magnitude when compared to reactive
approach. Obviously, the effect of proactive approach is more evident in cases
when sags are more frequent.
The proposed proactive approach that includes the availability equation, the
fault-injection and simulation framework the methodology and the disturbance
predictor may be applied to other types of disturbances except for voltage sags.
8.2 Overview of Main Contributions
The main contributions of the work presented in this manuscript may be sum-
marized as follows:
• Smart Grid dependability attributes have been proposed and a taxonomy
of Smart Grid faults has been developed.
• A model of proactive disturbance management has been developed, sup-
ported by a methodology and a metric for optimizing failure prediction
for improving availability. Guidelines for optimizing availability with the
proposed model and the metrics have been defined.
• A methodology for proactive management of disturbances in Smart Grid
has been developed and appropriate methods have been implemented.
• Simulation and fault-injection framework for analyzing behavior of power
grids in the presence of faults has been designed and implemented. The
framework focuses on Active Distribution Networks and is mainly intended
for generation of disturbance-related data for the design of predictors but
may also be used for other types of disturbance analysis.
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• To illustrate the methodology, a predictor for voltage sags caused by bal-
anced short-circuit faults and fluctuating load and distributed generation
has been developed as the case study. The effect of sag prediction and mit-
igation on availability has been analyzed. Also, we have investigated how
monitoring sampling rate, prediction window size and lead time affect the
quality of prediction.
8.3 Future Work
The presented work gives solid foundations to further develop and implement
proactive control approaches in Smart Grids. However, improvements and ad-
ditional verification may be needed before putting these solutions into practice
for a selected grid. This should also consider characteristics of the grid and con-
straints most critical points and types of disturbances, and available mitigation
means. Moreover, and especially having in mind the novelty of the proposed con-
cept and the ongoing grid modernization, the work may be further extended in
different research directions as it has raised additional questions in the sphere of
Smart Grid dependability and the use of proactive methods for its management.
The continuation of this work may include but is not limited to the following
major topics that are foreseen by the author:
• The developed model of proactive control may be enhanced to evaluate
the effect of prediction and proactive mitigation on other system proper-
ties such as security, maintainability, operational cost and life-cycle man-
agement. In the scope of such extension, mitigation means and metrics
for prediction optimization with respect to the properties should be iden-
tified or developed. These metrics may be developed in a similar manner
as those that we have proposed for optimizing availability. In the same
spirit, the proposed proactive control methodology may be adapted for the
minimization of the operational cost. Such a work could become a part of
a wider research on minimizing the total cost of ownership of ADNs and
Smart Grid in general. Moreover, a similar approach may be applied for
addressing dependability of other types of systems. In fact, in [134] we
have already proposed how it may be adopted for improving availability of
UPS’es.
• With its digitalization, the grid is more exposed to cyber-attacks and se-
curity of the Smart Grid, as a critical infrastructure, is becoming one of
the major concerns. In fact, cyber-attacks have already been identified as
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causes of a number of blackouts and we may only expect that they become
more frequent. Early-warning systems, that are essentially based on a sim-
ilar approach as the one for prediction of disturbances, may be developed.
Moreover, as cyber-attacks in power grids are not yet that frequent, there
may be a need to develop a similar framework to simulate security aspects
of Smart Grids. Finally, it would be worth combining the two approaches
and evaluating to what extent cyber-attacks may affect dependability, and
availability in particular, and how early-detection methods may help to de-
crease these effects.
• The developed simulation and fault-injection framework has a potential for
extension in numerous directions, especially that the fault-injection con-
cept was not commonly used in power systems simulation until recently.
Moreover, the framework was built as user-friendly in a sense of a simpli-
fied environment suitable for engineers with limited background in power
engineering. This is an important property as it helps computer scientists
to get more involved in Smart Grid development. The current implemen-
tation includes limited choice for fault-injection that was sufficient for the
case-study data generation. A possibility to inject other types of faults could
also be included. In fact, expanding the simulator and adding a possibility
to inject cyber-attacks, as proposed in [177] for computer networks, would
be very beneficial for evaluating security and dependability of Smart Grids
in an integrated fashion. It is also worth considering to use the tool for
evaluating robustness of the grid against specific types of faults that may
not be present at the moment but that are expected in the future as well as
the increased penetration of renewable resources and higher fluctuations
of consumption. In this way, the framework would become a comprehen-
sive environment for analyzing Smart Grid faults and disturbances. More-
over, it could be coupled with the predictor so that predictions are used at
simulation runtime to trigger proactive actions. Thereby, the effect of the
proactive control on availability could be analyzed through simulations in-
stead of using the model.
• Finally, once real-life data become available, the approach could be eval-
uated with that data. Moreover, the implementation in a real grid should
consider other aspects such as time needed to transfer the data from dif-
ferent parts of the grid as well as time needed for online processing. Both,
communication and processing must be very efficient processes consider-
ing that disturbances may, according to our analysis, be predicted only with
136 8.3 Future Work
a very short lead-time. Different architectures for implementation should
also be considered as, for example, centralized and decentralized.
In conclusion, electric power grid is a critical infrastructure whose depend-
ability should never be compromised. With its evolution, novel methods are
needed to ensure and to further endure its dependability. Even though the pro-
posed proactive management approach gives promising results for improving
availability, it must be incorporated into a wider strategy of Smart Grid man-
agement that combines different approaches to ensure grid’s dependability and
security in the light of an ever-increasing number and types of threats. In fact,
as Smart Grid is truly a system-of-systems, it is necessary to involve experts and
stakeholders from various domains including power and computer engineers as
well as experts in law, business and marketing, and to combine different meth-
ods in Smart Grid development as only with a unified and an interdisciplinary
approach we can make sure to keep it trustworthy, secure and efficient.
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